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I. INTRODUCTION
S UBSIDIARITY is a theory about the relationship among social struc-
tures, the common good and human dignity with a venerable pedigree
in European political thought. It concerns how persons become genu-
inely free by associating with others and what those associations, or "medi-
ating structures," imply about state authority. Paradoxically, subsidiarity
both empowers and limits the state-empowering it to remedy the inca-
pacities of social groups, but limiting its intervention by reference to the
integrity of those groups.' The term comes from the Latin subsidium,
meaning "help" or "reserve forces," and this etymology underscores the
calibrated scope of state action. 2 The state helps but does not absorb inter-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law. I am
grateful to the Lamar Order at the University of Mississippi for providing a
summer research grant for work on this article. I am also grateful to Robert
Araujo, S.J., Gerard Bradley, Charles H. Brower, I, John Czarnetzky, Richard
Garnett, Jack Wade Nowlin, Ronald Rychlak and Robert Vischer for helpful
suggestions on earlier drafts.
1. See generally George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in
the European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. Rv. 331, 332-44 (1994)
(noting paradoxical nature of subsidiarity); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Struc-
tural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38, 40-46 (2003)
("Subsidiarity is therefore a somewhat paradoxical principle."); Ken Endo, The
Principle of Subsidiarity: From Johannes Althusius to Jacques Delors, 44 HOKKAIDO L. REv.
652, 642-10 (1994); Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Be-
yond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REv. 103, 108-21 (2001) [hereinafter Vischer, Beyond
Devolution].
2. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 1, at 42 n.16, 44; Endo, supra note 1, at 642-40;
Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 118-20.
(67)
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mediate associations. In that way, it is thought, the people within these
associations will flourish most fully in their humanity, in their communi-
ties and in their relationships to the state.
3
Subsidiarity has two major aspects. Substantively, it functions as a
principle ordering the relationships among state authority and social
groups. Structurally, it describes the distribution of competences when
higher and lower public entities interact in a single system. 4 Thus, sub-
sidiarity may apply substantively to the interactions between the state and
labor unions, and it may apply structurally to the interactions between a
central government and its constituent governmental entities. 5 The struc-
tural aspect of subsidiarity is closely connected to federalism. 6 Indeed, it is
as a seed-bed for federalist ideas that subsidiarity has gained recent promi-
nence in the European Community. 7 Though intertwined, the substantive
and structural aspects of subsidiarity must be carefully distinguished.
This Article will use subsidiarity to illuminate a strategy for dealing
with religious establishments found in the United States Constitution, par-
ticularly in its Establishment Clause. Subsidiarity has been applied to
many fields, from public international law, to environmental policy, to
commerce, to corporate governance and even to human rights.8 Its appli-
3. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 1, at 45 (explaining that subsidiarity's "end
product" is "'greater flexibility and adaptability' in the social order," resulting in
"'a genuinely pluralistic society, ... which is a union of lesser societies each of
which maintains its own identity, function, and end'") (quoting Clifford Kossel,
Global Community and Subsidiarity, 8 COMMUNIO: INT'L CATH. REv. 37, 46-48 (1981)).
4. See, e.g., Endo, supra note 1, at 640-38 (explaining distinction between
"non-territorial" subsidiarity, which "initially represented the delimitation of
spheres between the private sectors and the public," and "territorial" subsidiarity,
which focuses instead on "the division of powers among several levels such as the
EC, the State, the Region, and the Local Authority").
5. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 1, at 41 (describing application of subsidiarity
to labor relations in Leo XIII's 1891 papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum); see also Ber-
mann, supra note 1, at 342-43 (describing "respect for internal divisions of compo-
nent states" as aspect of subsidiarity).
6. See Bermann, supra note 1, at 343 (observing "special relationship that ex-
ists between subsidiarity and federalism"); Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1,
at 122-26 (discussing relationship of subsidiarity to American federalism). For a
discussion of subsidiarity's relation to federalism, see infra notes 195-202 and ac-
companying text.
7. See Bermann, supra note 1, at 344-402 (discussing comprehensively promi-
nence of Federalist ideas within European culture); Endo, supra note 1, at 609-569;
see also Carozza, supra note 1, at 50-52.
8. See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw 239-41 (1999)
(discussing relationship of subsidiarity to international law); Bermann, supra note
1, at 344-48 (discussing European Community Treaties); id. at 346 & nn.42-47
(noting subsidiarity provisions in 1992 Maastrict Treaty concerning education, vo-
cational training, culture, health, consumer protection and industrial competitive-
ness); Carozza, supra note 1, at 56-79 (discussing international human rights law);
id. at 41 (discussing labor unions); John M. Czarnetzky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An
Empire of Law? Legalism and the International Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
55, 119-23 (2003) [hereinafter Czarnetzky & Rychlak, Empire of Law] (discussing
International Criminal Court in terms of subsidiarity); Ronald J. Rychlak &John
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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cation to religious establishments, as yet untried, is quite natural. Relig-
ious associations-regardless of whether they figure in religious
establishments-are social structures through which persons find mean-
ing, form communities, relate to others and interact with the state. Thus,
as a substantive norm, subsidiarity allows one to assess the role of religious
associations within a pluralistic society, and it consequently furnishes an
illuminating way of understanding the problem of religious establishments
as such. As a structural norm, subsidiarity helps place the Establishment
Clause within the federal framework of the United States Constitution. It
invites us to view the Clause as a structural strategy for dealing with the
problem of religious establishments as faced by the authors and ratifiers of
the United States Constitution.
Part II of this Article summarizes the general principles of subsidiarity
and places them within a theoretical and historical framework. Sub-
sidiarity emerges from this discussion as a theoretical tool particularly well
adapted to our modern, pluralistic society. It promotes a robust vision of
human freedom that transcends the isolated and individualistic liberty of
classical liberalism. Persons find this fuller notion of freedom-including
freedom of conscience-in communities that are supported and invigo-
rated, but not supplanted, by a state with powerful but limited
competences.
Part III addresses subsidiarity's relationship to constitutional rules
and to federalism. In terms of a constitution, subsidiarity appears less as a
rule embedded in a constitution-one that can be liquidated and applied
by courts-than as a principle guiding the creation of a federal structure
and the distribution of governmental competences in that structure.
After this lengthy preparation, Part IV turns to the heart of the mat-
ter: how subsidiarity can help us understand both the problem of religious
establishments and how that problem is addressed by the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution. First, as for religious establish-
ments proper, subsidiarity suggests a useful way of understanding the
kinds of problems posed by the interaction of religious associations and
government. Such problems are less a question of violating indeterminate
background principles-such as "neutrality" or "separation of church and
state"-than a question of the state absorbing the functions of a religious
association in a way that degrades the mediating character of the associa-
tion and compromises the state's ability to pursue society's common good.
At the same time, subsidiarity indicates that such problems are better han-
M. Czarnetzky, The International Criminal Court and the Question of Subsidiarity, 2000-
2003 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 115, 119, 121 (2003) (same); Vischer, Beyond Devo-
lution, supra note 1, at 104-05 (listing applications, including legislative initiatives
on poverty, environmental law, campaign finance reform, land use regulations and
radio broadcast licenses, as well as interpretations of Supreme Courtjurisprudence
on parental authority and Commerce Clause). See generally Symposium, 2J. CATH.
Soc. THOUGHT (2005) (discussing application of subsidiarity to faith-based charita-
ble organizations, school finance, bureaucracy, corporate governance, federalism
and federal prosecution).
2007]
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dled prudentially through political management than through rule-based
judicial resolution. Second, these insights suggest how the Establishment
Clause itself functions within the federalist structure of the United States
Constitution. The Clause emerges as a structural strategy for partitioning
the federal government from a volatile area of social policy-one de-
scribed by the First Amendment's rubric of "laws respecting an establish-
ment of religion"-to an area thought by the framing generation to be
more securely managed by individual states. Both of the conclusions sug-
gested by a subsidiary analysis conflict with our modern understandings of
religious establishments and the Establishment Clause. But this vexed
area ofjurisprudence and scholarship needs provocation to shake off un-
helpful theoretical baggage and to find promising ways forward.
Subsidiarity suggests several paths, developed in Part IV. As to the
modern problem of church-state interaction, subsidiarity proposes that it
is far more complex than slogans such as "separation of church and state"
and "neutrality" have led us to believe. Conversely, as to the Establishment
Clause itself, subsidiarity proposes that the Clause is far more modest than
two generations of Supreme Courtjurisprudence have led us to believe. A
subsidiary Establishment Clause is, first and foremost, one integrated intel-
ligibly into the overall structure of the Constitution. From that point of
view, the Clause addresses structures, institutions and jurisdiction more
than it promotes church-state theories or particular substantive outcomes.
A subsidiary Clause may not hold the answers to many of the problems we
currently associate with the Clause-for instance, the "correct" answers to
religious participation in voucher programs, or to the presence of relig-
ious symbolism in government buildings-but it promises to be a Clause
that courts can use consistently and coherently. Furthermore, a subsidiary
Clause may promote a more genuine and stable form of "religious free-
dom" by situating people's religious beliefs and activities within communi-
ties that are both empowered and circumscribed by state and society. This
is an appealing alternative to the stark polarities offered by much of the
Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence-a choice between the be-
liefs of the isolated individual and the interests of a powerful, unified state.
This Article is only a preliminary sketch of how subsidiarity interacts
with religious establishments and the Establishment Clause. It leaves
many areas unexplored, such as how a subsidiary Establishment Clause
jurisprudence might appear, and how a subsidiary Clause might protect
liberty of conscience. It deliberately postpones the question of incorpora-
tion of the Establishment Clause until the end, for good reason. For the
question of how the Clause applies to the states is parasitic on the ques-
tions of what the Clause means and how it relates to federalism. A subsidi-
ary view of the Clause does not roll back incorporation, but it does force
provocative questions about how incorporation of the Clause should be
carried out. These are questions that Establishment Clause scholars have
been asking recently with more and more insistence. A discussion of sub-
sidiarity provides a good point of entry into that debate. In fact, sub-
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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sidiarity should be a major part of the incorporation discussion-a
discussion about the dynamics of a massive shift in the federal structure of
our government-precisely because subsidiarity provides crucial insight
into the inner-workings of federalism itself.
One final caveat: this Article does not propose to recast every conun-
drum of Establishment Clause jurisprudence within the matrix of sub-
sidiarity. Nor does it promote subsidiarity as a new-and-improved "test" for
applying the Clause. What the article does is argue that subsidiarity is a
powerful tool for explaining the function of the Clause in our constitu-
tional structure. That alone is reason to consider what subsidiarity has to
say about religious establishments and the United States Constitution.
II. THE THEORY OF SUBSIDIARITY
A. General Themes
Subsidiarity begins and ends with the person. It assumes that the ba-
sic aim of societal structures, private and public, is to promote human dig-
nity and, hence, genuine freedom. It views human persons not as
instruments, but as ends in and of themselves. At the same time, persons
are irreducibly social and realize their most authentic humanity only in
community with others.9 Consequently, the notion of "freedom" at stake
in subsidiarity is not purely individual autonomy without restraint or inter-
ference. Rather, the freedom subsidiarity seeks to foster "means freedom
to act in such a way as to participate fully in the goods of an authentically
human life."'10
Subsidiarity builds upward from this basic focus on the person.
Human personhood requires a kaleidoscope of associations for its full ex-
pression. For instance, individuals need family associations to nurture
their basic affective, material, educational and spiritual needs.1 In the
economic sphere, individuals need to form associations for furthering pro-
duction, exchange and conditions of labor and pay in any free market
system. Such groups cannot function in isolation but must interact with
other groups to serve their members fully. 12 What results is an organically
intermeshed civil society, "understood as the sum of the relationships be-
9. See, e.g., Carozza, supra note 1, at 42-43 (explaining that "subsidiarity pre-
supposes that the human person toward whose flourishing the application of the
principle is aimed is naturally social") (citing Kossel, supra note 3, at 46).
10. See Carozza, supra note 1, at 43 & n.27 (citingJoHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW
& NATURAL RIGHTS 147 (1980)). Finnis explains that:
Human good requires not only that one receive and experience benefits or
desirable states; it requires that one do certain things, that one should act,
with integrity and authenticity .... Only in action (in the broad sense
that includes the investigation and contemplation of truth) does one fully
participate in human goods.
FINNIS, supra.
11. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 10, at 144-47 (discussing function of family in
subsidiarity).
12. See Carozza, supra note 1, at 43. Carozza explains that:
2007]
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tween individual and intermediate social groupings, which are the first re-
lationships to arise and which come about thanks to 'the creative
subjectivity of the citizen."13
Subsidiarity seeks to nourish these intermediate social groups,
whether by protecting them from government interference, empowering
them through limited but effective government intervention, or coordinat-
ing their various pursuits. The term "mediating structures" captures their
basic function. 14 A mediating structure could refer to any voluntary asso-
ciation-a family, a neighborhood, a church, a civic club-that "stand[s]
between the individual in his private life and the large institutions of pub-
lic life."1 5 Mediating structures "tend[ ] to facilitate self-empowerment
and [to] foster a sense of belonging and civic purpose[,]" while at the
same time channeling "meaning and value" to larger societal structures,
including the state.' 6 A legal policy or social structure resonates with sub-
sidiarity if it furthers this basic principle of facilitating, through mediating
[S]ubsidiarity envisions that just as the individual realizes his fulfillment
in community with others, so do smaller communities realize their pur-
pose in interactions with other groups-a group of families as part of an
educational community, for instance, or a group of workers as part of an
economy of production and exchange.
Id.
13. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FORJUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL
DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH para. 185 (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM] (quoting
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL SOLLICITUDo REi SocLALIs para. 15 (1987)). The Catho-
lic Church has made subsidiarity a foundation of its social teaching since the nine-
teenth century. For a discussion of the Catholic Church's incorporation of
subsidiarity, see infra notes 25-27, 83-87 and accompanying text. See generally
Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 108-10. As Robert Vischer correctly
notes, "[t]o invoke subsidiarity in public policy debates without acknowledging
and exploring its Catholic roots is to cut off the principle from the particular pri-
orities it reflects and the broader values it embodies." Id. at 109. As with its teach-
ing on natural law, the Church's teaching on subsidiarity is not grounded in
theological sources and is thus, in principle, accessible to anyone regardless of
religious presuppositions. See id. at 108; see also GEORGE, supra note 8, at 229 (dis-
cussing reasons for referring to Church's natural law teaching); POPE BENEDICT
XVI, ENCYCLICAL DEUS CARITAS EST para. 28a (2005) (explaining that Catholic
Church's social teaching, which was presented "on the basis of reason and natural
law," does not attempt to impose religious faith on state or non-Catholics).
14. See generally Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 116-21 & n.63 (not-
ing role of mediating structures in subsidiarity). Vischer relies primarily on the
seminal works by Richard John Neuhaus & Peter Berger. See Peter L. Berger &
Richard John Neuhaus, Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus Respond, in To EM-
POWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE TO CIVIL SOCIETY (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996);
Richard John Neuhaus & Peter Berger, To Empower People: The Role of Mediating
Structures in Public Policy, in THE ESSENTIAL NEOCONSERVATIVE READER (Mark Ger-
son ed., 1996) [hereinafter Neuhaus & Berger, Mediating Structures].
15. Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 116 (quoting Neuhaus & Ber-
ger, Mediating Structures, supra note 14, at 213-14).
16. Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 117. Vischer notes that:
Neuhaus and Berger's call for mediating structures-a call that has since
been echoed by many scholars-focused on neighborhoods, families,
churches, and voluntary associations. When properly functioning, these
institutions connect individuals to the wider society in ways that heighten
[Vol. 52: p. 67
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol52/iss1/3
SUBSIDIARITY
structures, both the flourishing of persons and the greater justice and re-
sponsiveness of state authority.
Subsidiarity recognizes that the state has an obligation to intervene in
aid of lower societal structures in appropriate and well-defined ways, but
that the intervention must be of a limited, incremental, temporary and
remedial nature. Theorists of subsidiarity thus speak of its positive and neg-
ative aspects.' 7 Positively, the state (or any higher societal association) of-
fers help to subordinate associations to the extent they cannot accomplish
their own ends. But negatively, there is a strong presumption against ex-
tensive state intervention into lower associations. Subsidiarity thus exhib-
its a "principled tendency toward solving problems at the local level and
empowering individuals, families and voluntary associations to act more
efficaciously in their own lives."18 These inseparable aspects of subsidiarity
attempt to reconcile the apparent antithesis of diversity and community. 19
The ultimate goal, built upon the uniqueness of every human person, is to
realize a "genuinely pluralistic society."20
The character of the help offered to lower associations is discerned at
the crossroads of positive and negative subsidiarity. The image of "absorp-
tion" offers some signposts. No association nourishes its members' dignity
by dissolving their individuality into a homogenized mass. This is true by
definition, given the purpose of an association is to nourish individual de-
velopment. Just so, higher associations must not absorb the unique quali-
ties and functions of lower associations. Interventions by higher
associations are necessitated and limited by the same problem-i.e., that
the lower organization requires some aid because it, for whatever reason,
cannot achieve its goals. But to preserve those lower associations as genu-
ine associations, the nature of the intervention must be partial and incre-
mental-"subsidiary" to the function and character of the association
aided. One certainly does not invigorate mediating structures by destroy-
ing them. Subsidiarity further cautions that one also fails to do so by pro-
viding a kind of intervention that robs them of their essential identity as
mediators. 21
their social awareness and maximize the impact of their actions, yet pre-
serve their own unique sphere of operation and identity.
Id. at 117 n.68; see also id. at 117 n.69 (citing Neuhaus & Berger, Mediating Struc-
tures, supra note 14, at 215).
17. See generally Carozza, supra note 1, at 44; Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra
note 1, at 118-21. As Fred Crosson writes, "[t]he responsibility of the state ... is to
assist the subsidiary groups in achieving their proper ends, and to implement those
ends itself only temporarily in circumstances where the subsidiary group is, per-
haps because of particular socio-economic conditions, incapable of functioning
normally." Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 119 (quoting Fred Crosson,
Catholic Social Teaching and American Society, in PRINCIPLES OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING 170-71 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998)).
18. Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 116.
19. See Carozza, supra note 1, at 44 (discussing duality of subsidiarity).
20. Id. at 45 (quoting Kossel, supra note 3, at 46).
21. John Finnis reasons that:
20071
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Subsidiarity's guiding principle is that intervention should "assist but
not usurp" mediating structures. 22 Various formulae may attempt to cap-
ture that idea-for instance, whether a higher association can "more effec-
tively or efficiently" attain a specified objective than the lower association,
or whether a particular problem presents "cross-boundary dimension or
effects." 23 But verbal formulae are just that-shorthand labels which con-
ceal numerous policy choices and open-ended questions demanding com-
plex argumentation. Also, each presupposes some basic agreement on, or
way of determining, the specific objectives to be met, or the particular
contours of a problem to be remedied. 24 No formula or test mechanically
substitutes for the basic goal of subsidiarity-i.e., fostering the vitality of
mediating structures in the service of human dignity and the common
good.
The Roman Catholic Church's formulations of the principle of sub-
sidiarity-contained principally in late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury papal encyclicals on labor relations-are the most carefully
elaborated modern statements of the principle and have consequently be-
come benchmarks for its development. 25 They are worth quoting at
length:
[T] he State must not absorb the individual or the family; both
should be allowed free and untrammeled action so far as is con-
sistent with the common good and the interest of others ....
Whenever the general interest or any particular class suffers, or is
threatened with harm, which can in no other way be met or pre-
vented, the public authority must step in to deal with it .... The
limits [of intervention] must be determined by the nature of the
occasion which calls for the law's interference-the principle be-
1J]ust as the dissolution of family and property would water down human
friendship, so the complete absorption by the family of its members
would radically emaciate their personal freedom and authenticity ....
To say this is to formulate, in relation to the family, a principle which in
fact holds good for all other forms of human community (though only in
a modified form for full friendship itself). Some recent political thinkers
have given this principle the name 'subsidiarity,' and this name will be
convenient provided we note that it signifies not secondariness or subor-
dination, but assistance .... [T]he principle is one ofjustice.
FINNIS, supra note 10, at 146.
22. Carozza, supra note 1, at 66.
23. See generally Endo, supra note 1, at 638-33 (discussing various criteria for
justifying governmental interventions under principle of subsidiarity). "Cross-
boundary effects" ask whether a problem is serious enough, or whether its effects
are so diffuse and difficult to contain that the lower association cannot cope with
the problem. Endo cites as one example "the measures to prevent acid rain, since
this issue in nature can rarely be solved by the efforts of a country or a region
alone." Id. at 635.
24. See generally Bermann, supra note 1, at 378-90 (discussing implementation
of subsidiarity as legislative precept).
25. See generally Carozza, supra note 1, at 41-42; Endo, supra note 1, at 627-21;
Vischer, supra note 1, at 108-15.
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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ing that the law must not undertake more, nor proceed further,
than is required for the remedy of the evil or the removal of the
mischief .... Rights must be religiously respected wherever they
exist, and it is the duty of the public authority to prevent and to
punish injury, and to protect every one in the possession of his
own. Still, when there is question of defending the rights of indi-
viduals, the poor and badly off have a claim to especial considera-
tion .... The State should watch over these societies of citizens
banded together in accordance with their rights, but it should
not thrust itself into their peculiar concerns and their
organization [] 26
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can
accomplish by their own initiative and industry and give it to the
community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a grave
evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and
higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can
do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish
help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and
absorb them. The supreme authority of the State ought, there-
fore, to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of
lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts
greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effec-
tively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone
can do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion
requires and necessity demands. Therefore, those in power
should be sure that the more perfectly a graduated order is kept
among the various associations, in observance of the principle of
"subsidiary function," the stronger social authority and effective-
ness will be the happier and more prosperous the condition of
the State.
27
26. POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL RERUM NOVARUM para. 35-37, 55 (1891).
27. POPE Pius.XI, ENCYCLICAL QUADRAGESIMO ANNO para. 79, 80 (1931); see
also POPEJOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL CENTESIMUS ANNUS para. 48 (1991) (discussing
application of subsidiarity to government social assistance). The recently pub-
lished COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH gathers together all
the relevant Church texts on subsidiarity. See COMPENDIUM, supra note 13, at para.
185-88. In his first encyclical letter, Deus Caritas Est, Pope Benedict XVI reaffirmed
the centrality of subsidiarity to the Church's social teaching:
The State which would provide everything, absorbing everything into it-
self, would ultimately become a mere bureaucracy incapable of guaran-
teeing the very thing which the suffering person-every person-needs:
namely, loving personal concern. We do not need a State which regulates
and controls everything, but a State which, in accordance with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity, generously acknowledges and supports initiatives aris-
ing from the different social forces and combines spontaneity with
closeness to those in need.
DEUS CARITAS EST, supra note 13, at para. 28b.
2007]
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B. Society, Associations and the State
Subsidiarity, as Paolo Carozza writes, "has an intellectual history as old
as European political thought."28 The following sections will attempt to
trace some of that history. This will deepen our understanding of sub-
sidiarity generally, but more specifically it will clarify how subsidiarity can
apply to the complex of issues posed by the interrelationship of religious
associations and the state in a pluralistic society, by the special problem of
religious establishments, and finally by the remedy to these various
problems offered by the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution.
29
Subsidiarity begins with the Aristotelian view that society is a web of
associations, each performing specific tasks and providing for its own
needs. Aquinas would develop this view by conceiving society as an organ-
ism, to which individuals are ordered prior to being ordered to them-
selves. 30 Far from obliterating the individual, these conceptions recognize
the natural links between persons and the inescapable fact that people
cannot live outside of a society and a culture. 31 Accordingly, the seven-
teenth century political theorist Johannes Althusius reasoned that society
precedes the state, not historically but ontologically. As the first to system-
atically describe a subsidiary society, Althusius imagined it as a multitude
28. Carozza, supra note 1, at 40.
29. My discussion draws heavily from the leading modern work on sub-
sidiarity, Chantal Millon-Delsol's THE SUBSIDIARY STATE. See CHANTAL MILLON-DEL-
SOL, L'ETAT SUBSIDLAIRE: INGIRENCE ET NON-ING#RENCE DE L'ETAT: LE PRINCIPE DE
SUBSIDIARITt AUX FONDEMENTS DE L'HIsTOlIE EUROPPENNE (1992); see also, e.g., Car-
ozza, supra note 1, at 40 (describing Millon-Delsol's book as "one of the most com-
prehensive available and one of the first standard sources for any study of the
concept"); Endo, supra note 1, at 646 (depicting it as "the most detailed study [of
subsidiarity] so far"). I am working from the Italian translation of Millon-Delsol's
book. See CHANTAL MILLON-DELSOL, Lo STATO DELLA SUSSIDIARIETA (Rosario
Sapienza trans., 1995).
30. See generally MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 18-30, 37-47 (discussing
roots of subsidiarity in Aristotle's Politics and Aquinas' Summa Theologica, Summa
Contra Gentiles and De Regno); see also FINNIS, supra note 10, at 159 (noting that
subsidiarity "is one important development of the Aristotelian political science");
Czarnetzky & Rychlak, Empire of Law, supra note 8, at 121 (observing that
"[s]ubsidiarity is closely related to Aristotle's concept of justice as friendship").
For a detailed explication of Aquinas's development of Aristotle on the subject of
subsidiarity, see Nicholas Aroney, Subsidiarity, Federalism and the Best Constitution:
Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 25 L. & PHIL. (forthcoming 2006),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=890811 (last visited Oct. 21, 2006).
31. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 40. As Millon-Delsol explains, Aqui-
nas's vision "does not mean that man is a simple means of which the community
makes use, but that man cannot reach his ends if not in terms of a broader com-
munity. Individually, he possesses the capacity to forge his own destiny, but
through the means of a society." Id. (author's trans.); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS,
DE REGNO, reprinted in ST THOMAS AQUINAS: POLITICAL WRITINGS 5-8 (R.W. Dyson
ed. & trans., 2002) (explaining why "[i]t is ... necessary for man to live in a com-
munity," and "necessary for there to be some means whereby such a community of
men may be ruled").
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of interlocking but distinct social groups, like "Russian dolls that nest one
within the other."
32
The social groups composing civil society, like the individuals within
them, can effectively seek their own ends. They possess an intrinsic capac-
ity that a leading modern theorist of subsidiarity, Chantal Millon-Delsol,
terms "human capability."3 3 This describes neither superhuman power
nor unlimited enlightenment, but rather a "concrete capability, an intrin-
sic knowledge of one's own proximate needs, the ability to manage quotid-
ian details, an everyday know-how."3 4 All groups and individuals, however,
have natural incapacities and thus must rely on assistance from higher
groups, including the state, to realize their own ends.
This insight points us to the justification for political power: neither
force nor divine right, but rather the basic need for authority to support
human endeavors.3 5 This justification intrinsically limits the exercise of
political power. As with any higher social entity, the interventions of the
governing authority extend only to areas where lower groups fall short. 3
6
This includes state intervention that helps groups maximize their own ca-
pacities by coordinating them for the collective good of society. 37 Govern-
32. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 50 (author's trans.); see also id. at 48-61
(discussing contribution of Althusius's Politics to theory of subsidiarity). Millon-
Delsol identifies Althusius as "the first author of federalism ... and at the same
time the first to describe a subsidiary society." Id. at 39 (author's trans.); see also
Endo, supra note 1, at 631-30 & n.5 (placing Althusius's contribution in historical
context).
33. Millon-Delsol locates the concept of human capability primarily in the
works of Montesquieu and de Tocqueville. See generally MILLON-DELSOL, supra note
29, at 62-82 (discussing contribution of Tocqueville and Montesquieu to theory of
subsidiarity); see also, e.g., 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 381
(Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., 2000) (discussing popular
sovereignty in terms of individual capabilities); MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS
VIII, VI (Thomas Nugent ed., Colonial Press 1899) (1748).
34. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 66-67 (author's trans.).
35. See AQUINAS, supra note 31, at 7 (explaining that authority is necessary
because "if many men were to live together with each providing only what is conve-
nient for himself, the community would break up into its various parts unless one
of them had responsibility for the good of the community as a whole").
36. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 26-28. Millon-Delsol observes, in
turn, that social groups' spheres of competence are limited, flexibly, by the capac-
ity of their various actors-tasks that go beyond that capacity should be confided
elsewhere. See id. The problem of "local despotism" from the social groups them-
selves, is remedied by applying the "same law of distribution of competences" to
those groups. See id. at 99-118 (author's trans.).
37. See id. at 18-19. Millon-Delsol draws this reflection from the Aristotelian
idea that the aim of the city was not merely to survive, but to "live well." See id. at
19 (author's trans.) (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I, 2, 1252 b29). The "supplemen-
tal" or "subsidiary" aid provided by the city "helps beings to develop themselves,
rather than merely to make up for their own deficiencies." Id. at 19-20 (author's
trans.).
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ment intervention is thus necessarily partial, incremental and
supplemental. 38 The theory of subsidiarity finds its roots in these ideas.
In stark contrast to the subsidiary state is the despot. The despot in-
trudes excessively into the competences of lower groups, in effect "trans-
pos[ing] domestic governance into political governance," and thus
treating people as incapable of managing their own interests.39 Especially
in Tocqueville and Montesquieu, the despot becomes not the arbitrary
tyrant, but rather the ruler who absorbs his subjects' initiatives.40 By con-
trast, the subsidiary political power, subordinated both to persons and so-
ciety, does not mediate "between society and its own good (as in
despotism), but rather mediates between social ends and their
realization. "41
Social groups interact with the state through a complex web of politi-
cal contracts. 42 These political contracts are not the social compacts of
John Locke. 4 3 For theorists of subsidiarity, the notion of social compact is
meaningless, since "society, in the sense of ties and relationships among
individuals, exists by nature."44 Against this background of a naturally oc-
curring civil society, political contracts crucially limit the power of the state
according to the rights of groups and the persons within them to act
within their own spheres of action. Social groups may therefore integrate
themselves within "more powerful communities to develop their own well-
being," without surrendering their integrity.
45
Concrete freedom thus demands the existence of free, intermediate
bodies within society. They manage the tensions between the socially
38. Any intervention, governmental or not, should also be proximate, that is,
applied wherever possible "between close-knit groups," since social groups nearest
to people's needs are usually best adapted to meet them. Id. at 113 (author's
trans.). Millon-Delsol explains the concept of proximity with a memorable illustra-
tion: "A giant cannot provide for all the needs of a Lilliputian: if the giant does not
annihilate him, he will carry him, but he is in any event incapable of participating
in his minuscule concerns." Id. at 47 (author's trans.).
39. Id. at 20 (author's trans.).
40. See id. at 64-66. As Millon-Delsol explains, these theorists dispel the histor-
ical reflex that used good and bad princes as the fundamental criteria in distin-
guishing political regimes, replacing it with a tendency to "categorize regimes
according to the extension of governmental activity." Id. at 64-65 (author's trans.);
see also MONTESQUIEU, supra note 33, at III; 1 TOcQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 82-93,
250-51, 661-65 (discussing various aspects of despotism).
41. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 43 (author's trans.).
42. See generally id. at 48-61 (discussing notion of "multiplicity of contracts" in
work of Althusius).
43. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. VIII re-
printed in JOHN LOCKE: Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 330-49 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Student ed. 1988) [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT]
(describing beginning of political societies); see also generally Robert A. Goldwin,
John Locke, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 476, 496-97 (Leo Strauss & Joseph
Cropsey eds., 3d ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1987) (1963).
44. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 52 (author's trans.).
45. Id. at 53, 56-59 (author's trans.).
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grounded autonomy of individuals and the interventions of the state.4 6
Societal aid, flowing from many decentralized sources, is thus assured of
being partial and calibrated to meet particular needs. 47 This further illus-
trates why subsidiarity avoids Lockean social contract theory: isolated indi-
viduals would inevitably strike bargains with political authority grossly
favoring the state. Only persons grounded in preexisting social groups-
individuals "rich with activities"-could negotiate genuine liberty with the
state.4 8 Consequently, the remedy for political authoritarianism is not the
liberty of isolated individuals but rather the mediating activity of free, in-
termediate associations.
49
This subsidiary strategy for securing freedom through mediating
groups necessarily implies structural limitations on government power.
Again, drawing on Tocqueville and Montesquieu, Millon-Delsol traces a
connection between the ability of free associations to flourish and the ar-
chitecture of a limited government. It is well known, of course, that Toc-
queville championed voluntary associations as crucial to individual
development and to checking tyranny.50 Millon-Delsol points out further
that Tocqueville specifically identified American federalism as "one of the
most powerful combinations in favor of human prosperity and free-
dom."5 1 In praising the American federal structure, Tocqueville con-
trasted the limited competences of the "immense, distant" federal
sovereignty with the more responsive sovereignty of states that "envelops
each citizen, and takes him over daily in detail."52 For Tocqueville, then,
46. Robert Vischer ably explains this mediating aspect of associations:
The value of associations derives, in significant part, from the extent to
which associations stand in tension with the individual on one side and
the state on the other. In other words, associations are important rela-
tionally, as their relationship with the individual and the state equips
them to fulfill a mediating role. This role allows associations to serve as
bridges between the individual and the surrounding, impersonal society,
but it also injects tension into the association's relationships with the indi-
vidual and the state.
Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations,
79 NOTRE DANE L. REv. 949, 951-52 (2004) [hereinafter Vischer, Associations] (cita-
tions omitted).
47. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 74-76, 100-07 (discussing societal
aid).
48. Id. at 100-18 (author's trans.).
49. See id. at 107-10.
50. See, e.g., 1 TOCQUEILLE, supra note 33, at 180-86 ("On political association
in the United States."); Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 961 (commenting on
Tocqueville's view that "American reliance on associations ... [were] a bulwark
against tyranny and ... an essential inculcator of democratic values").
51. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 74 (explaining that "beginning with a
description of America, and not from an imagined ideal, Tocqueville paints the
proper role of the State") (author's trans.); id. at 76 (describing that, for Toc-
queville, in American federalism, "clearly appear the paradox and the realized
unity of liberty and self-sufficiency") (author's trans.).
52. 1 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 158; see also id. at 57-65 (discussing ad-
vantages of localized governance in New England Township). As Harvey Mansfield
2007]
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American federalism provided the matrix within which associational free-
dom could operate.
53
C. Managing the Common Good
The subsidiary state pursues a substantive vision of the common good,
but in a manner subordinate to the efforts of social groups. 54 While ori-
ented to the common good, a just government's power is limited to con-
structing an ordered framework that oversees the diverse projects of
individuals and social groups. Political power is not the author of diver-
sity, but only "produce[s] the unity necessary for the development of di-
versity." 55 Thus the state safeguards and promotes the common good,
rather than defining it, in the sense of making up for the natural incapaci-
ties of social groups-social groups whose own efforts contribute to the
and Delba Winthrop explain, "Tocqueville elaborates several of the institutional
means Americans employ to temper majority tyranny[,]" including "'decentralized
administration' in federalism[.]" He also "specifies the means necessary to avert
mild despotism: associations-among which he includes local government, a free
press, an independent judiciary, respect for forms and formalities generally and
for individual rights in particular." Id. at lxxi.
53. For a discussion of the relationship between subsidiarity and federalism,
see infra notes 118-38 and accompanying text. In the same vein, Montesquieu's
theories of governmental structure grew out of the subsidiary vision that -the state is
secondary and supplemental to society. He rejected as impossible and dangerous
the idea of eliminating all injustice, opting instead to devise the best scheme for
controlling and prohibiting it. This naturally leads to the subsidiary state, because,
as Millon-Delsol explains, "[t]he more the activities left to the state increase, the
wider becomes the field of injustices that cannot be punished." MILLON-DELSOL,
supra note 29, at 72 (author's trans.). Only when reasonably detached from soci-
ety, can the state hope to govern it. Montesquieu's famous theory of separation of
powers within government emerges as a logical sequel, allowing control of govern-
ment itself by limiting its component parts. See id. at 71-74; see also MONTESQUIEU,
supra note 33, Books V, VI, VIII, XI, XV, XIX, XX, XXIII, XXVI, XXIX.
54. See generally Patrick Brennan, Jacques Maritain: (1882-1973), in 1 THE
TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 75, 94-
95 (J. Witte, Jr. and F. Alexander eds., 2006) (discussing idea of common good,
especially in work of Jacques Maritain). In Catholic social thought, the common
good is conceived as "the sum total of all those conditions of social life which
enable individuals, families, and organizations to achieve complete and efficacious
fulfillment." Id. at 96 (quoting Gaudium et Spes, in VATICAN COUNCIL 11: THE CON-
CILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 59, 74 (Austin Flannery ed., 1975)). Rob-
ert Vischer explains that:
Catholic social theory developed its theses [regarding the role of govern-
ment intervention] in response to the liberalism ofJohn Locke, by which
society is understood as a collection of individuals who have come to-
gether to promote and protect their private rights and interests. Catholic
social theory, by contrast, emphasizes the good of the community, not
just the rights of individuals.
Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 113-14 (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
55. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 38-40, 44-46 (author's trans.); see also
AQUINAS, DE REGNO, supra note 31, at I, ch. III, XV.
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common good.56 Russell Hittinger identifies this principle as central to
subsidiarity, as he explains: "[S]ubsidiarity presupposes that there are plu-
ral authorities and agents having their 'proper' (not necessarily, lowest)
duties and rights with regard to the common good."57 The state both su-
pervises and coordinates the various activities of social groups, while, in
exceptional circumstances, "bringing to a particular entity concrete goods
that it would not have been able to produce on its own." 58
This subsidiary view of the relationship between state power and the
common good, particularly as it appears in Catholic social theory, is anti-
perfectionistic. It recognizes that limited human beings and their institu-
tions will never ideally realize human dignity, as Millon-Delsol describes:
To social problems, one cannot simply find a solution in the
sense of a definitive systematization. There are means, imperfect
and tentative, for managing this critical condition permanently
in the equilibrium of the possible .... It is because the value of
dignity is plural, that is paradoxical, that [Catholic] social doc-
trine seeks a compromise between the duty of non-interference
and the duty of interference. In this area, the principle of sub-
sidiarity acquires its definitive dimension. 59
Consequently, subsidiarity does not furnish a priori criteria for state
intervention. In contrast with classical liberalism on the one hand (which
allows minimal intervention only for basic security) and with socialism on
the other (which allows comprehensive state intervention), subsidiarity
promotes equilibrium and not rigid solutions. As John Czarnetzky and
Ronald Rychlak explain, because subsidiarity focuses on the common
good, applying it requires judgments that are "nuanced, comprehensive,
and politica judgments, consequently "better left to political bodies, who
are far better equipped than courts" to formulate them.60 The govern-
ment, within its sphere of competence, thus has a great deal of prudential
latitude over the decision whether to intervene. But the very existence of
mediating structures checks government intervention: the "will of the [in-
termediate] groups themselves.., jealous of their own autonomy will pre-
vent the state from abusing its power by creating pretexts for
intervention."61
56. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 59-61. The conviction that all societal
entities (not just the state) contribute to the common good departs from both
classical liberalism and socialism. See id.
57. Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modem Catholicism, in 1 THE TEACHINGS OF
MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAw, POLITICS AND HuMAN NATURE, supra note 54, at 23.
58. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 131-33 (commenting on Taparelli's
work) (author's trans.).
59. Id. at 123-26 (author's trans.).
60. Czarnetzky & Rychlak, Empire of Law, supra note 8, at 121 (discussing appli-
cation of subsidiarity to International Criminal Court).
61. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 144-50 (author's trans.).
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Given subsidiarity's basic flexibility, one may ask legitimately whether
it provides reliable standards for conditioning state intervention, and for
attributing competences among governmental actors, private associations
and individuals. 6 2 But proponents of subsidiarity find in its apparent
"vagueness" not a defect, but the concept's central asset. Subsidiarity is
supposed to calibrate the relationship between civil society and the state
within the flux of circumstances, in pursuit of a maximum amount of lib-
erty. But liberty expresses itself in concrete conditions that cannot be pre-
dicted and managed by a priori rules.63 The imprecision latent in
subsidiarity therefore is exactly the point.64 Authority acts in a truly sub-
sidiary fashion only if it can adapt itself flexibly to the changing concrete
demands of liberty. Thus, subsidiarity does not furnish a blueprint delim-
iting the functions of the state and this-or-that social group. Rather, it is a
"purely formal" principle that manages the relationship between the state
and civil society, while their own interactions fix the concrete boundaries
between them. Subsidiarity does not allow us to ascribe rigid limits to the
competences of any social entity.65
D. The Person, Conscience and the Subsidiary State
As we have seen, subsidiarity views persons as naturally social crea-
tures, requiring the relationships society provides to be genuinely autono-
mous. 66  It therefore discards the individualistic view of classical
liberalism, first and foremost, as artificially ignoring human beings' basic
social and political nature. 67 In turn, society is more than a mass of atom-
62. See, e.g., Michael P. Moreland, Subsidiarity, Localism and School Finance, 2 J.
CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 369 (2005) (discussing "recurring theme in the literature on
subsidiarity... that the principle of subsidiarity is indeterminate, vague, and ulti-
mately unhelpful to the resolution of concrete legal and policy questions").
63. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 190. Thus, "[t]o begin to delimit
this condition [of developing liberty] would be absurd, since the capacity for lib-
erty varies continually." Id. (author's trans.); see also Czarnetzky & Rychlak, Empire
of Law, supra note 8, at 122 (noting that as applied to International Criminal
Court, subsidiarity suggests that, "[b]y focusing on an inquiry into the common
good of the nation and, therefore, the actual human beings involved, the calculus
of whether to assert jurisdiction in a particular case is not mechanically
foreordained").
64. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 190.
65. See id. at 193-94.
66. See id. at 39-42, 70-71; see also FINNIS, supra note 10, at 144-45 (discussing
subsidiarity and communism); Carozza, supra note 1, at 42-43 ("[S]ubsidiarity pre-
supposes that the human person toward whose flourishing the application of the
principle is aimed is naturally social. Her dignity requires relationship with others,
in a variety of ways and settings, from family life to political participation.") (inter-
nal quotations omitted).
67. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 185. By contrast, in Lockean classi-
cal liberalism, the individual can provide for everything he needs, except the secur-
ity necessary to enjoy it. These premises give rise to a particular conception of
state competence. See id. at 85-86; LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, supra
note 43, § 123 (explaining man chooses to enter political society because, in state
of nature, "the Enjoyment of [his freedom] is very uncertain, and constantly ex-
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ized individuals. As Russell Hittinger writes, "[s]ociety ... is not a mere
instrument ... [but rather] [i]t consists of plural and intrinsic forms, not
'masses' to be aggregated." 68 Free associations within society widen the
range and efficacy of individual action and because a person defines him-
self through actions, foster greater human development. 69
The liberty at the heart of subsidiarity involves more than freedom to
participate in governance; rather, it embraces a broader freedom to pur-
sue various kinds of activities. 7 0 Individual rights are consequently not un-
derstood exclusively "with an eye toward the lonely rights bearer," as Paolo
Carozza puts it.7' Freedom and rights are not abstractions nor are they
simply claims against the government. Instead the rights of naturally rela-
tional individuals are situated in the context of associations that are them-
selves primary to the state. They take on flesh by emerging from the
background of everyday life. 72 Within free associations, individuals can
both transcend themselves and create bulwarks against the state, as Robert
Vischer describes: "When afforded their natural vitality and vibrancy ...
associations are the vehicle by which we transcend our individual, atomis-
tic existences and carve out a communal role for ourselves that is distinct
from, and often in opposition to, the identity of the state." 73
Consequently, genuine human autonomy is likely not to be marked
by a strict equality, but instead by the inevitable, healthy variations of free
people with different abilities and interests.74 "Fake people"75 exhibit a
leveled sameness that is rooted in excessive individualism and counterfeits
authentic freedom. 76 Because the atomized individual possesses merely a
posed to the Invasion of others"); id. § 131 (discussing consequent limitations on
state power);JOHN LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in ON POLITICS AND EDUCA-
TION 21, 25 (Howard R. Penniman ed., 1947) (discussing limitation on civil magis-
trate's jurisdiction over "the salvation of souls").
68. Hittinger, supra note 57, at 22; see also Endo, supra note 1, at 618
("[S]ubsidiarity presupposes.., not the dichotomous society of atomised individu-
als and a strong State, but the graduated hierarchy in which various organisations
enjoy their autonomies.").
69. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 24-25, 42. Conversely, when the gov-
ernment deprives an individual of his ability to freely manage his own areas of
competence, it "steal[s] a particle of his being [and] mutilate [s] [him] by breaking
a naturally stable continuity." Id. at 67 (author's trans.); see also MONTESQUIEU,
supra note 33, Books VI, VIII.
70. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 23.
71. Carozza, supra note 1, at 46-47 (citing MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 47-75 (1991)).
72. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 49-54.
73. Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 958.
74. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 67-71.
75. Id. at 69 (author's trans.); see also 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 663
(describing character of persons under mild despotism as "an innumerable crowd
of like and equal men" and as "a herd of timid and industrious animals of which
the government is the shepherd").
76. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 70-71. As Millon-Delsol writes:
A person alone will never or rarely develop his own capacity for freedom.
He will remain proud, but naked, clothed only with the abstract essence
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truncated, abstract liberty, he therefore must be sustained by what Toc-
queville called the "immense tutelary power" of the omnipotent state.
77
By contrast, the ordered liberty of subsidiarity is a concrete mean between
the poles of authoritarian government and purely individual liberty, medi-
ated through social groups and situated in the details of practical life, as
the following lyrical description attempts to capture: "Before legislating,
administrating, constructing palaces and temples, [and] waging war, soci-
ety works, labors, navigates, exchanges, [and] profits from the sea and the
earth. Before consecrating kings and instituting dynasties, a people
founds the family, blesses weddings, constructs cities, [and] stabilizes
property and succession."
78
Modern theorists, principally the neo-thomist scholar Luigi Taparelli,
have developed the relationship between subsidiarity and rights, particu-
larly the rights of conscience. 79 The subsidiary state is empowered to in-
tervene by creating the conditions for individual action, by aiding
particular groups in need, and by undertaking tasks useful to the common
good, but which had been neglected. This state power carries with it the
concomitant responsibility of protecting a person's basic rights, grounded
in human dignity-the right to live, to have means for preserving life and
to apply oneself freely to activities.8 0 But these rights, as Russell Hittinger
underscores, come not from the state but rather from the "proper mode
of the free man that declarations confer upon him. But associating him-
self with others elevates him to the realization of autonomy, and he be-
comes genuinely free.
Id. (author's trans.); see also 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 482-84 (describing
individualism in democratic countries).
77. See, e.g., 2 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 33, at 663 (describing actions of mildly
despotic state); 1 id. at 426 ("As conditions become more and more equal and
each man in particular becomes more like all the others, weaker and smaller, one
gets used to no longer viewing citizens so as to consider only the people; one for-
gets individuals so as to think only of the species."). See generally id. at lxiii-lxvi
(discussing Tocqueville's treatment of equality and individualism).
78. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 111 (author's trans.) (quoting M. Ri-
viRRE, DE LA CAPACITE POLITIQUE DES CLASSES OUVRIRREs 215 (1924)).
79. See, e.g., Hittinger, supra note 57, at 16, 23 (describing contribution of
Taparelli to modern understanding of subsidiarity). Apparently, none of
Taparelli's work on subsidiarity has been translated into English. Of his work, Mil-
lon-Delsol remarks that "in his Essay on Natural Law, and in his numerous articles
appearing in [the journal] Civiltd Cattolica, Taparelli laid the groundwork for the
social doctrine that would soon be articulated by the Vatican, opposing himself
both to liberalism and socialism and seeking an alternative to modern individual-
ism." MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 131 (author's trans.).
80. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 119-38. Because of its different con-
ception of the human person, the Lockean state has a more restricted role, provid-
ing only for basic peace and security. It also lacks the capacity to conceive of, and
therefore to positively foster, any objective notion of the common good of its sub-
jects. It tends to "suspect in the development of groups the birth of particular
despotisms," and holds that "only the individual is the subject of rights." Id. at 86-
89 (author's trans.).
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of action" of social groups themselves. 8' The upshot is that the state has
no power to interfere with the consciences of persons, an insight that al-
lowed Taparelli to ground the right of conscience firmly within sub-
sidiarity. As Millon-Delsol describes, Taparelli
affirm [ed] that no one, and above all not the political authority,
can force someone to believe. Spiritual allegiance depends on
personal decision and authority has no right in that regard. But
the perfect society would be that in which there is a general alle-
giance to perfect values. And authority cannot help but try to
guide society towards that perfection.8
2
Integrating subsidiarity into its social teaching in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Catholic Church grounded the affirmative duties of the state on
the protection of human dignity rather than on abstract equality or indi-
vidual liberty.8 -3 The Church's view of human persons as having a funda-
mental and equal dignity by virtue of being human included both their
liberty and equality, but sought a richer autonomy than either alone pro-
vided.8 4 The Church's social teaching thus avoided absolutizing individ-
81. See Hittinger, supra note 57 at 23 (explaining that, in Taparelli's thought,
subsidiarity "describes the right (dritto ipotattico) of social groups, each enjoying its
own proper mode of action").
82. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 136 (author's trans.). This is a notable
development because the theory of subsidiarity had developed earlier in the con-
text of societies, such as the seventeenth century of Althusius, where the state guar-
anteed religious conformity, often enforcing a single religious system on all
persons and communities. There was, in short, no subsidiarity with regard to relig-
ious practice or belief. The theory of subsidiarity should be distinguished from its
application in different eras, with different conceptions of liberty of conscience.
As Millon-Delsol explains with regard to Althusius:
Althusius is not antidemocratic and it is this that distinguishes him from
his antecedents. He believes in popular sovereignty and cannot conceive
of legitimation without consent. His entire social system belies the small-
est intention of dictatorship, except on the religious plane. But he is a
child of his own era: the notion of liberty of conscience remains unknown
to him .... This reveals, instead, the conception of the era and recalls
for us the immense religious disputes of that period in which Althusius
was the administrator of Emden. Beyond that, it reminds us that the lib-
erty of autonomy claimed in the Politics [of Althusius] is a liberty as far as
means, but not as far as ends. It is only in the 20th century that the
notion of a subsidiarity state will truly consider liberty as extending to
ends, when the individualistic society will have become an inescapable
reality.
Id. at 56 (author's trans.).
83. See generally id. at 119-26, 138-50 (discussing Church's adoption of sub-
sidiarity as foundation of social teaching); Bermann, supra note 1, at 339 (noting
concept of subsidiarity can be traced to twentieth-century Catholic social philoso-
phy); Carozza, supra note 1, at 41-42 (describing development of Catholic social
theory and subsidiarity); Endo, supra note 1, at 627-22 (explaining Catholic roots
of subsidiarity); Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 108-10 (explaining
Catholic roots of subsidiarity).
84. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 119-26. The concept of human dig-
nity necessarily embraces individual liberty and personal responsibility, "[b]ut at
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ual liberty, as in classical liberalism, and equality, as in socialism. On this
view, a person's rights are various facets of the entire complex of human
dignity itself.8 5 As with Taparelli, the upshot of this reasoning placed strict
limits on the power of the state to interfere with the individual or social
groups in matters of conscience. For example, commenting on the
thought of Pope Pius XII and John Courtenay Murray, Russell Hittinger
explains that the 'Juridical" (that is, limited or "instrumental") state "coor-
dinates and facilitates rather than exemplifies the perfections and actions
of society. Not being an end in itself, the state cannot be sacralized nor
directly assigned juridical care of religious institutions."8 6 These interre-
lated ideas-the limited state, human dignity, and the rights of conscience
and religious freedom-would prove decisive in the documents of the Sec-
ond Vatican Council, most famously Dignitatis Humanae, affirming a robust
view of the inviolability of human conscience by the state and of the state's
responsibility to protect religious freedom.8 7
This delicate relationship between conscience and the subsidiary state
can also be appreciated from a different angle: how some theorists of sub-
sidiarity have worked out the apparent tension between individual rights
of conscience and the state's promotion of the common good. Admit-
tedly, there must be some minimal objective vision of the common good if
the state hopes to fulfill its affirmative, albeit subsidiary, role in guiding
society toward its realization. But the problem remains of how such a vi-
sion is compatible with an individual's freedom of opinion and belief.88
By shifting from the older concept of an organic society to a newer vision
of an organized society, modern theorists of subsidiarity have adapted its
view of the common good to the modern understanding of rights, espe-
cially the rights of conscience.
The organic concept of society presupposed a relation in which "an
individual is tied to society as a branch is to a tree or a hand to a per-
son."8 9 The common good emerged from an internal consensus of soci-
ety, but was itself an objective truth transcending any individual's own
conception. Contradicting that common good would be viewed as irra-
tional, a conclusion in tension with a modern understanding of liberty of
conscience. 90 Simply imposing such a view of the common good would
involve a kind of despotism. 9 1 To adapt subsidiarity to a modern individu-
alistic society required reconceiving the common good in terms of the
the same time it implicates a decent life, humanized work, [and] a minimum of
'possessions' that liberty cannot always grant." Id. at 121 (author's trans.).
85. See id. at 121-26. Indeed, Catholic social thought saw a fundamental dan-
ger in selecting certain rights to the exclusion of others.
86. Hittinger, supra note 57, at 21 & nn.50-51.
87. See generally id. at 23-26.
88. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 136-38.
89. Id. at 169-76 (author's trans.).
90. See id. at 176-77.
91. See id. This is not to say that the older understanding of the common
good was a form of despotism, but simply that the changed conditions of modern
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human person. The personalistic philosophy of theorists like Jacques Mar-
itain9 2 furnished one of the primary theoretical bases for this task.93
Personalism is a philosophy that places the human person at the
center of society, but not as the isolated individual of classical liberalism.
It seeks to preserve (as classical liberals did not) a notion of the common
good as a positive objective of the state. 94 Embracing a pluralistic society
with its diversity of goals, the state would no longer define the common
good, but would instead facilitate society's pursuit of it through individual
action and purposes.9 5 As James Schall explains, "any political common
good is always itself related to the individual persons whose good it fosters
and ... it is their good or purpose, not its own, for which any organized
civil society exists."9 6 The community is thus ordered to the person, not
only as to the means of action, but also as to the ends of action. 9 7 This is
perhaps best summed up in what Patrick Brennan calls "the most famous
line associated with Maritain: 'Man is by no means for the State. The state
is for man." 98 While the classical liberal conceives the common good sim-
ply as a complex of circumstances the state secures, a personalist would
claim the state must positively foster individual human dignity.9 9 The
society make that notion of an objectively held common good, if imposed from
above, despotic. See id. at 178.
92. See generally JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (Richard O'Sullivan
ed., 1954) [hereinafter MAITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE] (discussing sovereignty and
rights of man); JACQUES MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD (1947)
(distinguishing between individuality and personality); see also JAMES V. SCHALL,
JACQUES MARITAIN: THE PHILOSOPHER IN SOCIETY (1998); Brennan, supra note 54, at
75-114 (describing and explaining Maritain's philosophy).
93. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 169; see also Endo, supra note 1, at
617-14 (discussing role of personalism in subsidiarity). Another important philo-
sophical basis was the notion of solidarity, which sought to provide a moral
grounding for societal ties among persons while emphasizing the realistic limits of
societal perfection. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 169-70; see also Susan J.
Stabile, Subsidiarity and the Use of Faith-Based Organizations in the Fight Against Poverty,
2 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT, 313, 333-34 (2005) (discussing relationship of sub-
sidiarity to solidarity).
94. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 171.
95. See id. at 178-79.
96. SCHALL, supra note 92, at 205 (describing Maritain's understanding of
common good).
97. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 179 ("Personalism opposes the per-
son to the state, in order to make of the state a means, and the person an end.")
(author's trans.). Maritain sharply dismissed the idea that the state itself has a
personality to which human persons are subordinate. See SCHALL, supra note 92, at
204-05. Instead, the state is simply an "instrument in the service of man[.]" MARI-
TAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note 92, at 11; see also Czarnetzky & Rychlak, Em-
pire of Law, supra note 8, at 101 & n.170 (discussing Maritain's personalist view of
common good).
98. Brennan, supra note 54, at 94 (quoting MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE,
supra note 92, at 19).
99. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 179; see also Brennan, supra note 54,
at 96 (explaining that "Maritain defined the state as that part of the body politic
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common good is inextricably bound to the good of individual persons, as
Maritain explains in his classic work, Man and the State.
What is the final aim and most essential task of the body politic
or political society? It is ... to improve the conditions of human
life itself, to procure the common good of the multitude, in such
a manner that each concrete person, not only in a privileged
class but throughout the whole body politic, may truly reach that
measure of independence which is proper to civilized life and
which is ensured alike by the economic guarantees of work and
property, political rights, civic virtues, and the cultivation of the
mind.100
The common good thus transcends vague notions of public welfare
and order, possessing "more concrete human implications, for it is by na-
ture the good human life of the multitude and is common to both the
whole and the parts, the persons into whom it flows back and who must
derive benefit from it."10 1 This personalist re-calibration of subsidiarity
seeks a middle ground between an impersonal common good and the de-
tached good of isolated individuals. Subsidiarity thus "places the necessity
of individual development within the context of the common good."10 2
For these reasons, Paolo Carozza can accurately affirm that subsidiarity's
"basis is personalistic, rather than contractual or utilitarian," and that "the
value of the individual human person is ontologically and morally prior to
the state or other social groupings." 10 3
The question that remains is how to determine the content and prac-
tical application of this person-centered common good, given that it sim-
ply cannot be imposed from on high as a matter of blind traditionalism or
authoritarianism. 10 4 What is required is a means of achieving broad con-
sensus that is not necessarily the same as majoritarian determination. Mil-
lon-Delsol describes this process as a "battle of argumentation to convince
[others] of the justice of the content which they would give to the com-
mon good."10 5 This does not subjectivize the content or application of
whose aim is to secure the common good, including persons' achieving their nor-
mality of functioning, for the body politic").
100. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note 92, at 49. Describing Mari-
tain's thought, James Schall explains that "[t]he state is subordinate to and stands
in the service of the reality of the person who has freedom and intelligence and
who is directly related to the external common good." ScHALL, supra note 92, at
205.
101. MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE, supra note 92, at 10.
102. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 181 (author's trans.).
103. Carozza, supra note 1, at 42.
104. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 54, at 97 (distinguishing between Maritain's
thoughts regarding legitimate authority in law-which arises from law's comport-
ing with human practical reason-and exercise of power, "which is force others
are merely obliged to obey").
105. MILLON-DEL.SOL, supra note 29, at 185-88 (author's trans.).
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the common good. To the contrary, the common good represents the
prudential working out of a distinct notion of human dignity, grounded in
cultural history, philosophical notions of right, and religious conceptions
of the human person. 10 6 Notably, Millon-Delsol identifies "seculariza-
tion"-or the concrete relationship between religion and public life-as
an apt subject for this process of public argumentation in which the con-
tent of the common good is hammered out. 107 Such a debate on the
place of religion in society does not simply pit two monolithic and irrecon-
cilable positions against each other, but rather "express [es] the contradic-
tions that one confronts when one must translate these values into
concrete terms."1 0 8 In this debate, the state does not somehow adopt a
supra-moral and abstract stance of neutrality. 109 At the same time, while
society's common good must include the spiritual ends of human beings,
this does not mean that the state has direct superintendence over those
ends. To the contrary, as Patrick Brennan explains, "although the com-
mon good is society's ultimate end, even society is limited insofar as the
person has an end in another, surpassing order."1 10 Maritain recognized
that society should seek to foster conditions favorable to persons' spiritual
development, but also affirmed that "[t] he end of political society is not to
lead the human person to his spiritual perfection and to his full freedom
of autonomy."l
1
The personalistic emphasis of subsidiarity informs the question of
when the state should intervene with regard to lower organizations. As
discussed, the pivot of subsidiarity in its modern form is the dignity of the
human person. Instead of abstract liberty, "it is [a person's] dignity that
defines him, in the measure that his dignity includes liberty, the need for
security, the need for minimal material well-being, [and] the need for con-
In any case, determining the content of the common good by consensus
remains the only possibility open to us in the conditions of diversity in
which we find ourselves. We have no other choice, if we are not to return
to religious or ideological coercion. This will not prevent anyone from
believing that an objective notion of the common good exists, but he will
have to persuade others of his idea without any longer being able to im-
pose it. This will involve a battle of argumentation to convince others of
the rightness of the content that one gives to the common good-a diffi-
cult but legitimate prospect, given that to convince others one will have
to refine his own theses.
Id. at 186 (author's trans.).
106. See id. at 187 (discussing foundations of notion of common good); see also
Brennan, supra note 54, at 95 (observing that, for Maritain, "[t]he common good
is the shared life of a political community of free persons living oriented toward
justice, friendship, and the transcendent").
107. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 187.
108. Id. (author's trans.).
109. See id.
110. Brennan, supra note 54, at 95.
111. Id. (quoting JACQUES MARITAIN, INTEGRAL HUMANISM; TEMPORAL AND
SPIRITUAL PROBLEMS OF A NEW CHRISTENDOM 134 (Joseph W. Evans trans., 1973)).
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sideration, among other things."11 2 A person's rights concretely express
that intrinsic dignity. Those rights are inseparable from an ability to de-
velop oneself through actions, which in turn reminds us that full human
flourishing requires association with others and the aid various associa-
tions provide. 13 This conception of rights suggests that state intervention
demands not just a purely subjective desire, but also a need "felt by the
individual in relationship to his requirements of dignity, and also in rela-
tionship to the society in which he lives." ' 1 4 At a minimum, the rights
protected by the subsidiary state must include "immunity from external
coercion as well as psychological freedom."11 5 But at bottom the personal-
ist re-imagination of subsidiarity reinforces the idea that the cornerstone
principle of government non-interference applies not only to action, but
also to thought and belief.' 16 As Maritain wrote, even if the state may
punish someone for an act of conscience that violates the law, "in like
circumstances the State has not the authority to make me reform the judg-
ment of my conscience, any more than it has the power of imposing upon
intellects its own judgment of good and evil, or of legislating on divine
matters, or of imposing any religious faith whatsoever."1 17 Here again ap-
pears the interplay between the subsidiary state, the essential dignity of the
human person and that person's rights of conscience.
III. SUBSIDIARITY AND FEDERALISM
What has been said so far about subsidiarity provides sufficient tools
to apply the theory to the question of religious establishments as such.' 1 8
But if the theory is to be applied to the Establishment Clause as well, one
additional question needs exploring. That question is whether the princi-
ple of subsidiarity can be expressed in a constitution and if so, what form
that expression should take. As will be discussed, the answer to this ques-
tion will affect how subsidiarity applies to the Establishment Clause. Spe-
cifically, this answer will determine whether it makes more sense to say
112. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 198 (author's trans.).
113. See id. at 196-99 (explaining necessity of human associations).
114. Id. at 202-06 (author's trans.).
115. Philip A. Pucillo, Toward a Subsidiarity-BasedJudicial Federalism, 2 J. CATH.
Soc. THOUGHT 463, 466 (2005) (citing POPE PAUL VI, DIGNITATIs HuMANAE para. 2
(1965)). Pucillo also observes that when the state intervenes to vindicate individ-
ual rights, subsidiarity
would require [the state] to minimize the extent to which its ruling would
disturb the pursuits of individuals and communities who have no direct
involvement in the dispute. That way, the state can intervene for the pur-
pose of performing an essential function while respecting the rights of
any number of individuals and communities to pursue their objectives.
Id. at 468.
116. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 202-06.
117. Brennan, supra note 54, at 99-100 (citingJACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS
OF MAN AND NATURAL LAw 77-78 (Doris C. Anson trans., 1943).
118. For a discussion of the theory of subsidiarity, see supra notes 9-117 and
accompanying text.
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there is a substantive notion of subsidiarity embedded in the Clause it-
self-one which a court presumably could apply to particular church-state
problems-or whether the Clause serves a subsidiary function in the over-
all constitutional structure by severing the federal government from a par-
ticular area of social policy. As will be seen, the latter view better captures
the subsidiary function of the Clause in relation to the federal structure of
the Constitution.
Subsidiarity can apply to the role of any authority, public or pri-
vate.1 19 Asking how subsidiarity illuminates the relationship between state
authority and civil society, however, raises the interconnected questions of
whether the principle is intelligibly embedded in a constitution and
whether the principle is susceptible to judicial enforcement. Certainly,
subsidiarity is expressed in various ways in several European constitu-
tions. 120 But the theory and function of subsidiarity raise doubts about
the utility of simply "writing subsidiarity into" a limiting constitutional pro-
vision-for example, a provision requiring a higher governmental author-
ity to "take action in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity" only to
the extent that lower states cannot "sufficiently achieve" proposed objec-
tives. 12 ' While the classical liberal state confines the competences of state
authority to definite boundaries, "the idea of subsidiarity implicates, to the
contrary, that public intervention does not have virtually any limit
preventatively fixed by socio-political doctrine. '122 Subsidiarity, then, is
better described as a condition on the exercise of state authority, rather
than an a priori limit on it:
The conditions requiring intervention cannot be objectively de-
fined: incapacity, negligence, [and] pressing need are oscillating
119. As Millon-Delsol explains, subsidiarity can apply to "every field of social
life which poses the problem of the attribution of competences." MILLON-DELSOL,
supra note 29, at 207 (author's trans.).
120. See id. at 213 (discussing provisions in German constitutions directly in-
spired by subsidiarity); see also Maastricht Treaty on European Union art. A, Feb. 7,
1992, 1757 U.N.T.S. 30615 (requiring new European Union "decisions [to be]
taken as closely as possible to the citizen"); id. art. B (requiring Community institu-
tions to "respect[ ] ... the principle of subsidiarity" in pursuing their objectives
under the treaty); id. art. 3b (requiring Community, in non-exclusive areas, to
"take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as
the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Mem-
ber States"); Bermann, supra note 1, at 344-47 (discussing provisions in European
Community treaties based on subsidiarity); Lorenza Violini, Subsidiarity and Modern
Public Administration: The State of the Art in Matters Related to the Implementation of the
Principle in Italian Regions, 2J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT, 401, 402-04 (2005) (discussing
failed attempt to embed subsidiarity in Italian Constitution and its eventual imple-
mentation at regional level).
121. Maastrict Treaty on European Union art. 3b. See also Bermann, supra
note 1, at 34546; see also Violini, supra note 120, at 406-07 & n.9 (observing "[t]he
decision whether to assign the judiciary a role in reviewing legislative respect for
subsidiarity has been considered a highly problematic one" and collecting sources
addressing issue).
122. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 212 (author's trans.).
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criteria that depend on circumstances. The essential characteris-
tic of the principle is its flexibility without which it would have no
reason to exist, since it seeks to create an equilibrium. One
could not, in any case, render it rigid . . . by prescribing in a
juridically obligatory manner a sector of reserved competences;
to the contrary, [subsidiarity] presupposes that there are no re-
served competences.1
2 3
Thus subsidiarity does not translate easily into ajudicially enforceable
set of rules and, to that extent, does not function as an a priori constitu-
tional limit on state authority. 12 4 Even theorists such as George Bermann,
who see a limited role for the European Court ofJustice in enforcing sub-
sidiarity principles, view the primary function of subsidiarity as informing
the political judgments of legislatures, to which courts should strongly
defer. 12
5
123. Id. at 215 (author's trans.).
124. Millon-Delsol envisions a limited judicial role in enforcing subsidiarity,
reasoning that "its juridical formulation can help avoid both the excesses of state
intervention as well as the gaps of non-intervention, leaving open the possibility of
recourse to the law in a case of conflict." Id. (author's trans.). But she cautions
that:
[T]he principle cannot be applied directly, but can only guide the valua-
tions of political and social actors. In German and Swiss law, the idea of
subsidiarity appears, not so much as a norm of right, as much as an at-
mosphere, a kind of background, an implicit reference point. It inspires
the entire federal system.
Id. (author's trans.). George Bermann notes that:
The German Constitutional Court has in effect determined that the
largely comparable provisions on federal subsidiarity in the German Con-
stitution are nonjusticiable, with the result that the "necessity" for federal
government legislation in areas of concurrent competence is essentially a
political question to be decided by the political branches without judicial
interference.
Bermann, supra note 1, at 393-94 (footnotes omitted); see also id. nn.248-49 (com-
menting on German Constitutional Court decisions on justiciability of Article 72 of
Grundgesetz Constitution); P.J.C. Kapteyn, Community Law and the Principle of Sub-
sidiarity, 2 REVUE DES AFFARES EUROPENNES 35, 42-51 (1991) (arguing principle
should be considered categorically nonjusticiable) (cited by Bermann, supra note
1, at 393 n.247). For a different view of subsidiarity and judicial review based on a
variation of federal abstention doctrine, see Pucillo, supra note 115, at 485-93.
125. Bermann reasons that:
If, as seems evident, subsidiarity addresses issues that are ordinarily rele-
gated to the political realm, then subsidiarity's central function must be
its legislative one. This means in turn that each participant in the Com-
munity's legislative process should . . . determine whether the measure
under consideration meets the test of subsidiarity, and act on the mea-
sure accordingly.
Bermann, supra note 1, at 367; see also id. at 378-90 (describing subsidiarity as
"mode of legislative analysis"). Bermann takes a limited view of the Court of Jus-
ice's role in enforcing subsidiarity. See id. at 390-403 (discussing judicial enforce-
ment). He notes that the contingencies which make subsidiarity difficult for a
legislature to apply "make the inquiry even more problematic for the Court." Id. at
391. He therefore advocates limiting Court review to the procedural question of
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This question takes on a different aspect if we ask not whether sub-
sidiarity can be translated into judicially enforceable constitutional rules,
but whether the principle can be integrated into, and expressed through,
a governmental structure. Federalism bears the strongest earmarks of a
subsidiary structure. 126 Indeed, for Millon-Delsol, a federal system repre-
sents "the concrete expression of the formal principle [of subsidiarity and]
its most meaningful and elaborated expression."' 27 In a federal system, a
central government comprehends entities that are themselves genuine
state authorities. The system exemplifies subsidiarity because the coalition
of lower state entities preexisted the formation of the central government,
consenting to its creation and empowerment. The constituent states al-
ready possessed the competences of self-government, but decided, in view
of their mutual benefit, to divest themselves of certain competences "with-
out themselves abandoning the tasks thought necessary to the common
good."' 28 The clearest examples of the creation of federal systems, ex-
plains Millon-Delsol, are the United States and Switzerland, and her
description of the dynamics of those systems tracks the structure of the
U.S. Constitution:
[T]he powers of the federal state are delegated to it, and all the
powers not devolved on the federal state remains with the feder-
ated states. This transmission from low to high reveals where the
origins of power lie. The [governmental] competences belong
naturally and without need of any rational justification to the
nearest entities. The competences of the [central] state must, on
the contrary, receive justification, since they emerge from a sec-
ondary need. The competences of the federal state are enumer-
ated, that is, restrictive and based on rational calculation. 129
Thus, the formation of a federal state is subsidiarity-in-action, the
structural elaboration of the theory itself. Millon-Delsol can thus say
broadly that the "history of federalism follows the philosophical history of
the principle of subsidiarity."' 3 0
whether the Community institutions properly considered local remedies, as op-
posed to the substantive question of whether Community action comports with a
norm of subsidiarity. See id. at 391-92, 400. Review would "pay[ ] pronounced def-
erence to [legislative] judgments on the substance of the matter." Id. at 400.
126. See generally MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 215-20.
127. Id. at 215 (author's trans.).
128. Id. at 215-16 (author's trans.). Such a divestment of governmental func-
tions-"guaranteed by a contract at the moment of the creation of the central
state"-stands in marked contrast to the downward concession of powers by a pre-
existing central sovereign. Id. at 216 (author's trans.).
129. Id. at 217 (author's trans.).
130. Id. (author's trans.). Among some commentators, there appears to be a
sharp difference of opinion about the relationship between subsidiarity and Ameri-
can federalism. Thus, David Currie claims that "subsidiarity is the guiding princi-
ple of federalism in the United States," while George Bermann concludes that
subsidiarity is neither in the "lexicon of U.S. Constitutional law" nor a "central
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Subsidiarity also provides insight into the most difficult practical as-
pect of federalism: the division of competences between the central and
constituent governments. 3 1 From the viewpoint of subsidiarity, the divi-
sion is not so much a rationalized parceling-out of discrete governmental
functions-one to the central government, another to the lower govern-
ments-but rather "a question of equilibrium" that can itself change ac-
cording to circumstances.' 3 2 This equilibrium must be understood, of
course, within the context of the delegated competences of the central
government. The combination of those two aspects in the matrix of sub-
sidiarity suggests the twin aspects of federal power in the U.S. Constitu-
tion-i.e., that the powers of the federal government are limited in the
sense that they are delegated, but also plenary within their sphere of oper-
feature of U.S. Constitutional practice" and is "foreign to the law and practice of
federal legislation." Compare David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, in 1 GREEN BAG 2D 359,
359 (1998), with Bermann, supra note 1, at 403, 406. But the divergence may not
be as deep as it sounds. Currie is essentially echoing Millon-Delsol in discerning
the lineaments of subsidiarity in the American federal structure, specifically in the
enumeration of congressional powers, which Currie calls "a concretization of the
subsidiarity principle." Currie, supra, at 360. But as to the actual operation of
federal powers, Currie sees subsidiarity at work, not as an independent limiting
principle, but as a background premise seen, for example, in the interstitial and ad
hoc nature of federal law, in the gradual expansion of federal power in areas be-
yond state competence and in judicial decisions limiting the reach of federal
power. See id. at 360-64. Bermann, on the other hand, focuses primarily on
whether there is an independent subsidiarity check in the American system on the
operation of federal power. Beyond political checks inherent in the federal struc-
ture itself, Bermann discerns no independent subsidiarity principle in that struc-
ture. He does, however, see the potential for application of subsidiarity in, for
instance, legislative frameworks, judicial enforcement of commerce power and
other doctrines, and agency regulations (although he is skeptical about how well
subsidiarity meshes in practice with American federalism). See Bermann, supra
note 1, at 40348, 449-53. For our purposes, the important difference between
these two commentators centers on whether a federal structure as such qualifies as
a structural expression of subsidiarity. Millon-Delsol and Currie think a federal
structure does not necessarily function as a subsidiary structure, while Bermann
believes it does. The difference may simply lie in an emphasis on substantive out-
comes over structure. Robert Vischer takes both commentators' views into ac-
count, but like Currie and Millon-Delsol, finds subsidiarity reflected in the
theoretical and structural premises of American federalism. See Vischer, Beyond
Devolution, supra note 1, at 122-26; see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitu-
tional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 836 (1996) (proposing model of American
constitutional federalism based on subsidiarity); Douglas W. Kmiec, Liberty Miscon-
ceived: Hayek's Incomplete Relationship Between Natural and Customary Law, 40 AM. J.
Jumis. 209, 215 (1995) (discerning subsidiarity in Tenth Amendment).
131. See Kmiec, supra note 130, at 217-19; see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37
(James Madison) (describing difficulties in drawing line between federal and state
competences in drafting of U.S. Constitution).
132. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 218 (author's trans.). Millon-Delsol
illustrates this dynamic equilibrium by reference to the history of power sharing
between the Swiss cantons and the central government. One could find analogues
of this equilibrium in American federalism-for instance, in the waxing and wan-
ing of federal congressional power throughout the twentieth century, or in the
gradual incorporation of the federal bill of rights against the states.
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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ation, and that these powers are constrained ultimately by the representa-
tive structure of the government and by the sheer existence of lower
governments and social groups. 133
Viewed through the lens of subsidiarity, federalism integrates govern-
mental structure with individual freedom.' 3 4 The federal organization
resonates with subsidiarity because it promotes a liberty situated less within
the confines of abstract theories of right than within concrete situations
and realistic human capacities.' 3 5 In effect, federalism declares itself una-
ble to provide rationalized solutions to intractable political and social di-
lemmas.1 36 Rather, it proposes a flexible matrix for pluralistic societies
through a graduated governmental structure. As Millon-Delsol explains:
Defenders of federalism maintain that [subsidiarity's] political
organization of proximity, which ties the necessity of sovereignty
to respect for autonomies, would be the only one able to effec-
tively manage the increasingly explosive diversities of contempo-
rary societies. It deals above all with managing and not resolving,
since politics for [its defenders] is not a science capable of resolv-
ing human problems. The idea of subsidiarity-and conse-
quently also of the federal organization-implies a realistic
philosophy in which human paradoxes can be held together, as-
sumed, managed, without attempting to resolve them, given the
inherent imperfection of nature. 13 7
By this account then, federalism provides a structure within and
through which the theoretical substance of subsidiarity is aptly expressed.
This is not to say, of course, that a federal governmental structure is the
only means of expressing subsidiarity in practice. But it is to say that one
sees subsidiarity clearly at work within the lineaments of federalism. Fur-
ther, subsidiarity allows one to grasp better the purpose of a federal struc-
ture. For at bottom, subsidiarity is not simply about devolution of power
to the lowest possible level of government. Instead, as Russell Hittinger
explains, subsidiarity is "a normative structure of plural social forms ... an
133. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 378 (1819)
(concluding federal power supreme within its sphere); THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Al-
exander Hamilton), No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing nature of federal power).
134. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 219.
135. See id.
136. A famous example of this sort of "refusal" to provide definite solutions to
social and political problems is Madison's explanation in Federalist 10 and 51 of the
Constitution's solution to the problem of factions. In those writings, Madison ex-
plained that an extended federal republic remedied the problem of majority fac-
tions through indirect and mechanical means-i.e. an extended geography,
increasing pluralism and divided governments would prevent majority factions
from coalescing-rather than the direct means of, for instance, creating a monar-
chical "will" separate from the majority. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James
Madison); see also GEORGE W. CAREY, THE FEDERALIST: DESIGN FOR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL REPUBLIC (1989) (discussing Madison's treatment of majority factions).
137. MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 220 (author's trans.).
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account of the pluralism in society."138 The theory of subsidiarity there-
fore clarifies the animating purpose of federalism-to offer a structure for
managing pluralism. Federalism provides a matrix within which diverse
constituent governments can co-exist for their mutual benefit without re-
linquishing their own identities or capacities for self-government.
As we will see, this account of federalism resonates with the formation
and operation of the U.S. Constitution. This will be crucial in understand-
ing the role of the Establishment Clause within our federalist structure.
The problem of how religious associations relate to a secular state, particu-
larly the problem of religious establishments, is a paradigm instance of
delicate social issues that demand political management rather than math-
ematical solutions. A subsidiary account of the Establishment Clause de-
picts the Clause not as providing courts with the overarching equation for
deriving solutions to the establishment problem, but instead as insuring
the fundamental political and social conditions within which the problems
posed by religious establishments can be, and in fact were, resolved. Part
IV will explore the intricacies and challenges presented by this subsidiary
view of the Establishment Clause.
IV. SUBSIDIARITY, ESTABLISHMENTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
We can now use the theory of subsidiarity to construct a framework
for understanding the general problem of religious establishments and
the narrower question of how the Establishment Clause addresses that
problem. This will present its share of difficult questions, but grappling
with them will show how subsidiarity can clarify thinking about this area.
First, this part of the Article will translate the notion of a religious estab-
lishment into the vocabulary of subsidiarity. This will suggest a helpful way
of understanding the establishment problem, one rooted in the actual
functioning of religious associations and the state, and one unencum-
bered by the tedious conceptual baggage of establishment clause
jurisprudence.
The Article will then address the Establishment Clause itself and ask
how subsidiarity can illuminate its function within the wider framework of
the U.S. Constitution. As the analysis thus far suggests, subsidiarity is not a
source for judicially-enforceable rules about relationships between state
authority and religious associations. Paradoxically, this will help explain
the role of the Establishment Clause within the constitutional structure.
Through the lens of subsidiarity, the Clause can be understood as a strat-
egy for partitioning the national government from the divisive issue of
founding-era religious establishments, consequently leaving to states the
task of managing how various religious groups would coexist with each
other and with state authority.
138. Hittinger, supra note 57, at 23.
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A. Subsidiarity and the Establishment Problem
Religious associations are a prime example of mediating structures-
social groups that provide individuals with meaning, opportunities for ac-
tion and a matrix for relationships unavailable to them in isolation-those
intermediate associations which, as we have seen, are central to the func-
tioning of the subsidiary state.139 As associations, they possess their own
unique identities and range of competences capable of transmitting mean-
ing to society and to the state, and capable of contributing to the common
good. Situating religious associations within the framework of subsidiarity
enables us to evaluate their functions in relation to other associations and
to the state. A problematic religious "establishment" can then be con-
ceived as a situation in which state authority has compromised a religious
association's mediating functions. Conversely, an "establishment" could
arise when a religious association has improperly absorbed the governing
functions of state authority. This provides a helpful vantage point from
which to view a religious "establishment," one measured against the con-
crete interactions between state and associations, instead of against the
elusive standards of modern establishment clause jurisprudence.
Situating the problem of religious establishments within the vocabu-
lary of subsidiarity first requires explaining why religious associations are
properly seen as social groups that mediate between individuals and the
state. 1 40 This is a straightforward concept, and so requires only a brief
sketch. As subsidiarity has increasingly embraced individual liberty of con-
science, the theory naturally includes religious associations as mediating
structures. That inclusion meshes with the treatment of religious associa-
tions in both state and federal jurisprudence in this country. Religious
groups have long been deemed autonomous legal associations capable of
interacting with other groups and with the state in order to transmit values
and work for the common good.
Subsidiarity developed in significant part during a period in Western
European history when state authority enforced religious orthodoxy. 14 1
139. Robert Vischer explains that "[t]he mediating status of a group or insti-
tution stems ... from their tendency to facilitate self-empowerment and foster a
sense of belonging and civic purpose." Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at
117. A mediating structure
connect[s] individuals to the wider society in ways that heighten their
social awareness and maximize the impact of their actions, yet preserve
their own unique spheres of operation and identity. From a subsidiarity
perspective, these attributes are invaluable because they instill a sense of
responsibility for one's self and one's surroundings, along with the tools
needed to act in betterment of both.
Id.
140. On the nature of associations as mediating structures, see generally
Vischer, Associations, supra note 46.
141. For a discussion of the development of the principle of subsidiarity in
Europe, see supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text. See alsoJOHN WITTE, JR., RE-
LIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIB-
ERTIES 9-19 (2000). On the relationship between church and state throughout the
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The common good was understood as an objectively verifiable, universally
held truth that encompassed religious belief and practice, one that was
upheld by the state. Individuals and groups may have been free to choose
means for accomplishing their own purposes, but their autonomy did not
include free ends, including religious ends. Those ends lay in state cus-
tody. This was less a product of subsidiarity itself than of the era's limited
notion of the liberty of conscience and of the common good. 142 Sub-
sidiarity has since developed, particularly in the work of Catholic social
theorists and the Catholic Church itself, into a careful integration of lib-
erty of conscience with the common good.143 With this development, sub-
sidiarity naturally embraces religious associations as mediating structures,
both as to ends (i.e., religious opinions and beliefs, worship and organiza-
tion) and means (i.e., religiously-motivated social action, such as charity,
education or political action). Modern theorists of subsidiarity classify re-
ligious groups among the most important of mediating structures. 144 For
instance, in their pioneering work, Richard Neuhaus and Peter Berger em-
phasize that religious institutions "are singularly important to the way peo-
ple order their lives and values at the most local and concrete levels of
their existence," and that consequently "they are crucial to understanding
family, neighborhood, and other mediating structures of empower-
ment.145
American law has long echoed this insight of subsidiarity by treating
religious groups as autonomous legal associations deserving statutory and
constitutional protection. There are many ways of demonstrating this, but
two in particular will serve here. First, American states have consistently
Middle Ages and beyond, see generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW & REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 85-119, 165-224 (1983); BRIAN
TIERNEY, THE CRIsIs OF CHURCH AND STATE, 1050-1300, 159-210 (1988).
142. See MILLON-DELSOL, supra note 29, at 56.
143. For a discussion of subsidiarity as Catholic social theorists understand it,
see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g, Carozza, supra note 1, at 47 (considering "religious communities"
and "the freedom of religious belief and worship" as building blocks of subsidiarity
in context of international human rights law); Pucillo, supra note 115, at 466 (in-
cluding among mediating structures "religious, national, cultural and educational
organizations").
145. Neuhaus & Berger, Mediating Structures, supra note 14, at 228. Elaborat-
ing this claim, Robert Vischer explains that:
Nearly one-half of all associational memberships in this country are
church related, one-half of all volunteering occurs in a religious context,
and one-half of all personal philanthropy is religious. Further, there is a
significant spillover effect, as churchgoers are substantially more likely to
be involved in secular associations. And because religion is, at its center,
about community, religious associations provide valuable insight into the
sense of belonging that is made possible by associational life.
Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 960 (citing ROBERT NISBET, THE SOCIAL PHI-
LOSOPHERS: COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT IN WESTERN THOUGHT 162 (1973); ROBERT
D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY
66 (2000)); see also Stabile, supra note 93, at 334-55 (discussing role of faith-based
organizations as mediating structures in poverty alleviation programs).
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and strongly affirmed the legal autonomy of religious associations. Most
early state constitutions explicitly recognized the religious pluralism re-
flected in the variety of religious "institutions," "societies," "associations"
and/or "corporations."14 6 Such entities took a broad array of forms be-
sides traditional churches: "lower schools, colleges, seminaries, charities,
cemeteries, hospitals, asylums, poor houses, mission societies, [and] relig-
ious clubs[.]"' 4 7 Thirty-six state constitutions guaranteed equality for
these associations. 148 A few constitutions went further, granting affirma-
tive constitutional rights to religious associations for purposes such as in-
corporating, holding property, receiving donations and entering
employment contracts. 149 The existence of this robust associational plu-
ralism was not only an end in itself, but also, as John Witte observes, a
critical means of "ensuring religious liberty... [by] serv[ing] as a natural
check both on the monopolistic inclination of any church and on the es-
tablishment tendencies of any state." 15
0
Second, although one could look to modern jurisprudence15 1 and
scholarship 152 affirming the associational integrity of religious groups, the
example of pre-incorporation Supreme Court jurisprudence makes the
146. As John Witte describes:
The Delaware Constitution guaranteed the "rights, privileges, immunities
and estates of religious societies." Kansas included a right of religious
groups to incorporate and to hold corporate property. Louisiana and
Maryland protected the rights of religious trusts and charities to receive
donations. Maine and Massachusetts provided that religious societies had
freedom to enter contracts with their ministers. New Mexico explicitly
protected the church authority's right to acquire and use sacramental
wines. But most states left the issue of particular religious group rights to
statutory, rather than constitutional, formulation.
WITrE, supra note 141, at 91.
147. Id. at 90.
148. See id. (explaining state constitutional guarantees for religious
associations).
149. Id. at 91. Two states, Virginia and West Virginia, went in the opposite
direction and "banned the right of religious groups to organize themselves as cor-
porations." Id.
150. Id. at 90.
151. See, e.g.,Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (explaining requirement
that "civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by
the highest court of a hierarchical church organization"); Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (holding religious controversies
are not proper subject of civil court inquiries); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,
344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952) (asserting organizational integrity of cathedral).
152. See generally, e.g., DANIEL 0. CONKLE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: THE RELIGION
CLAUSES 101-02 (2003); Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Educa-
tion and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841 (2001) [hereinafter
Garnett, Henry Adams's Soul]; Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term
Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91 (1953); Doug-
las Laycock, Toward a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor
Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); Brett G.
Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1217 (2004); Mark
Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 71 (2001).
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point forcefully.Before the incorporation of the religion clauses against
the states in the 1940s, the Supreme Court had heard only seventeen cases
touching religion, nine of which concerned church property disputes.1 53
Justice Miller's observation in Watson v. Jones,15 4 an 1871 intra-church dis-
pute over religious property, summarizes the Court's positive view of relig-
ious associations: "Religious organizations come before us in the same
attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable pur-
poses, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the
protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its re-
straints."155 John Witte explains that in such cases, the Court acted on the
premise that "[r]eligious groups, like all other legal associations, must be
allowed to retain a corporate charter once lawfully given and must be al-
lowed to use their properties in any lawful manner they deem apt, without
undue interference by the state." 156 The Court even deferred to the deci-
sions of religious authorities, reasoning in a famous passage that:
[T]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize
voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dis-
semination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for
the decision of controverted questions of faith within the associa-
tion . . . is unquestioned.1
57
These early religion cases embraced the premise that religion, as both
an individual and corporate enterprise, deserved legal protection, and
that religious groups were entitled to use property and arrange internal
business according to their own self-understanding. 158 Consequently, it is
easy to say that the basic conditions for applying subsidiarity to religious
153. See WIrE, supra note 141, at 108.
154. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
155. Id. at 714 (noting Court's view of religious associations, as discussed in
WIrE, supra note 141, at 109).
156. WIrE, supra note 141, at 108 (describing Justice Story's opinion in Terrett
v. Taylor) (citing Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815)). In Terrett, the
Supreme Court's first religion case, the Court struck down an 1801 Virginia law
rescinding the 1776 charter of the Episcopal Church and requiring it to dispose of
its glebe lands because the law violated "principles of natural justice." Terrett, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) at 52 (rejecting complainant's contention that church lands had
been divested after revolution and that complainants (overseers of poor of parish
of Fairfax) were enjoined from claiming title to land).
157. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728-29. Witte also discusses the 1872 case, Bouldin v.
Alexander, in which the Court stated: "[W]e have no power to revise or question
ordinary acts of church discipline, or of excision of church membership .... [W] e
cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the excom-
municated have been regularly or irregularly cut off." WITT, supra note 141, at
109-10) (quoting Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 139-40 (1872)).
158. See WITrE, supra note 141, at 110; see also JAMES HITCHCOCK, 1 THE SU-
PREME COURT AND RELIGION IN AMERICAN LIFE 3-17 (2004) (discussing Supreme
Court's treatment of church property and governance disputes).
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associations-associational integrity and autonomy-have long existed in
American law.' 
59
Recognizing that religious groups function as mediating associations
invites inquiry into the particular roles and competences of such
groups.' 60 Religious associations perform a myriad of societal functions
that go beyond providing individuals with a place for religious worship.' 6 1
Reflection on any period of history finds religious groups at work in virtu-
ally every field of social endeavor. 162 One barely starts by mentioning
charities, health care, education, counseling, legal reform and social and
political advocacy.163 Unsurprisingly then, much of the Supreme Court's
religion jurisprudence involves the participation of religious groups in so-
cial functions-preeminently education, but also, in the Court's first dises-
tablishment case, the provision of health care.' 64
Since subsidiarity is supposed to adapt its requirements to the con-
crete demands of liberty in particular circumstances, the theory itself fore-
closes an exhaustive list of the competences of religious associations.
Those competences will fluctuate depending on the kind of association
and its particular social and historical milieu. The basic point is that re-
flection on how religious associations act as mediating structures begins by
considering how religious groups function in a definite time and place.
While it is difficult to speak comprehensively about a topic as broad as the
"function" of religious associations in our pluralistic society, Robert
Vischer has constructed a helpful taxonomy of how associations generally
perform mediating functions-"identity, expression, purpose and mean-
ing"-which "correspond to the four dimensions in which the mediating
relationship occurs: place (identity), voice (expression), power (purpose)
and autonomy (meaning)."16 5 Indeed, Vischer uses religious associations
as primary examples of such mediating functions. 166 In terms of Vischer's
159. See, e.g., Garnett, Henry Adams's Soul, supra note 152, at 1842 (observing
Supreme Court cases recognizing freedom of expressive and religious association
are "true to the principle of subsidiarity").
160. See CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE
161-80 (1950).
161. See id.
162. A striking and instructive example from the Middle Ages is the role of
religiously-grounded guild associations in the creation of the very notion of the
city. See id.
163. An excellent starting point for reflection on the societal roles that relig-
ious groups have played in our own history is the two-volume set, A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA TO 1877 (Edwin S Gaustad & Mark A. Noll eds.,
3d ed. 2003), particularly Volume 2, chapter 8, entitled "Religion and Society
Engaged."
164. See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 297-300 (1899) (upholding con-
gressional grant to build two hospitals in District of Columbia that were run by
order of Roman Catholic nuns); see also WITrE, supra note 141, at 107-08 (discuss-
ing jurisprudence of religious organizations acting in societal roles).
165. Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 963-64.
166. See, e.g., id. at 960 (noting that "much of my analysis focuses on religious
associations, primarily because they are such a crucial component of voluntary as-
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categories, one begins to imagine the powerful and wide-ranging roles
that religious associations perform in our society. To sketch a few, the
religious association is a vital center for individuals to join freely together
and forge a place for constructing a common set of values and beliefs, for
speaking and acting more powerfully and coherently in the surrounding
society, and for creating effective buffers against corrosion by the state or
other societal forces. 16 7 Given that most religious associations focus on
those questions at the deepest heart of human concern, it is difficult to
overstate the delicate character of their mediating function. As Vischer
observes, "[t] he worldview embodied by a particular association of individ-
uals dedicated to a like-minded conception of ultimate meaning is at the
center of those individuals' very beings.' 68
In view of the various functions of religious associations-whether the
more inwardly-focused ones of providing places for communal belief, wor-
ship and support, or the more externally-focused ones of providing loci
for care, social criticism and political action, one naturally considers their
interaction with state authority. Subsidiarity, as we have seen, fundamen-
tally concerns the attribution of competences among societal groups, in-
cluding the state itself. It is precisely here that subsidiarity can illuminate
the problem of religious establishments. Subsidiarity suggests thinking
through the practical problems of church-state relationships, not only de-
scriptively, but normatively. The theory does not merely illuminate the
contours of the competence problem, but goes further by considering
how the competences of religious associations ought to co-exist with, over-
lap or be kept separate from, the competences of the state. Subsidiarity
aims to preserve the vitality of mediating structures-in this case the relig-
ious association-in the societal web, and thereby promote both the genu-
ine freedom of the person within the association, the vitality of the
association itself and the common good.1 69
Like any other healthy social group, a religious association mediates
between individuals and the state by creating a unique relational space,
one standing in constructive, creative tension with both the state and indi-
viduals.1 70 Robert Vischer describes this relational role of associations:
[T] he value of associations derives, in significant part, from the ex-
tent to which associations stand in tension with the individual on one side
sociations in this country"); id. at 986 (focusing on religious associations to illus-
trate mediating dimension of"power," or "allowing [members] to join together in
pursuit of a common purpose").
167. See id. at 969-1011 (generally discussing these four kinds of associational
mediation).
168. Id. at 984.
169. See, e.g., Vischer, Beyond Devolution, supra note 1, at 116 (finding sub-
sidiarity's "focus is on fostering the vitality of mediating structures in society"); id.
at 118 ("While mediating structures do function as bulwarks against government
encroachment, they are also facilitators of individual empowerment and
efficacy.").
170. See Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 963.
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and the state on the other. In other words, associations are important
relationally, as their relationship with the individual and the state equips
them to fulfill a mediating role. This role allows associations to serve as
bridges between the individual and the surrounding, impersonal society,
but it also injects tension into the association's relationships with the indi-
vidual and the state.'
7 1
Because subsidiarity is designed to safeguard the integrity of associa-
tions, as applied to religious groups, the theory leads one to conceive of a
problematic religious "establishment" as an attribution of competences
among the state and religious associations that compromises an associa-
tion's mediating character to the detriment of the association itself, to the
person, to the state and to society at large. One might say that because the
state has taken too much from the association (or given too much to it),
the association's basic ability to create a particular relational space has
been damaged. This approach to thinking about religious establishments
has some distinct advantages over the ways we have become accustomed to
contemplating them. 17 2
An adequate, stable description of a religious establishment continues
to elude American jurisprudence and scholarship. Even if one were lim-
ited to describing an establishment as a legal phenomenon with historical
roots in sixteenth and seventeenth century England and its American colo-
nies, formulating a useful legal taxonomy would be daunting. 173 The diffi-
culties are vastly compounded by taking the view that a "law respecting an
establishment of religion" is not merely an identifiable historical legal con-
struct, but rather a governmental practice that partakes of some "aspect"
of an historical establishment, or one that tends to manifest the "evils" of
bona fide establishments. 74 One can thus understand, if not excuse, the
171. Id. at 951-52 (citations omitted).
172. Indeed, as I discuss below, the most dramatic advantage that subsidiarity
affords is to encourage us not to think of the "establishment problem" necessarily
as a problem of constitutional magnitude, but rather to conceive most of the di-
lemmas that we now call "establishment problems" as prudential matters subject to
political management. In this section, however, I am simply comparing a sub-
sidiarity-driven analysis of common "establishment problems" with the usual analy-
sis, which is of course driven by a variety of constitutional law tests. For a
discussion of subsidiarity's application to establishment problems, see infra notes
178-92 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the
Founding, Part I: Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2105, 2131-81
(2003) [hereinafter McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment] (developing le-
gal taxonomy for founding-era religious establishments).
174. Michael McConnell writes that:
In the absence of more serious historical consideration of establishment
and disestablishment at the time of the Founding, the Supreme Court has
based its interpretation of the First Amendment on abstractions, such as
"advancement of religion," "entanglement," "coercion," "endorsement,"
"neutrality," and above all the "wall of separation between church and
state." While not entirely inaccurate, these abstractions are several steps
removed from the actual experiences that lay behind the decision to deny
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excrescence of judicial tests formulated to root out establishments-e.g.,
whether a law lacks a "secular purpose," "advances or inhibits religion,"
"entangles the government in religion," "psychologically coerces religion,"
"endorses religion," creates "divisiveness" or fails to be "neutral" between
"religion and non-religion" and so on. t 75 These formulations may be of
little help in reaching objective decisions, 176 but at least it is clear why they
exist: to identify an undesirable church-state arrangement, or an "estab-
lishment of religion" that is putatively banned by the Establishment
Clause. 1
77
Reconfiguring this quest within the framework of subsidiarity does
not promise a new test, but it does point toward an analysis that transcends
slogans and attempts to get to the heart of why certain relationships be-
tween religion and government are problematic. As already explained,
subsidiarity holds that state authority should act to remedy the incapacities
of social groups, but should never absorb them, in the sense of substitut-
ing its own maladapted functions for their more precisely calibrated ones.
Thus, subsidiarity would see the archetypal "religious establishment" as
presenting, in essence, a problematic distribution of competences among
state authority and religious associations. The analysis would focus on how
that distribution impacts the mediating character of the religious associa-
tions and, by extension, the freedom of the persons within them. Gener-
ally speaking, one would want to identify church-state arrangements in
which religious associations' mediating role becomes degraded because of
involvement with state authority. 178 Perhaps the function of a religious
the government authority to erect or maintain an establishment of relig-
ion. At best they are oversimplifications; in some respects they are
misleading.
Id. at 2205-06.
175. See generally WIrTE, supra note 141, at 149-84; Kent Greenawalt, Religion
and the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 161-74 (2004); Michael McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 117-68 (1992).
176. As Steven Smith observes, "[n]early all scholars-and, in less judicious
moments, many judges and Justices-complain that the constitutional doctrines of
religious freedom elaborated by the Supreme Court make little sense, and that the
decisions rendered under these doctrines are chaotic." STEVEN D. SMITH, GETTING
OVER EQUALITY: A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA 1 (2001)
[hereinafter SMITH, EQUAliTY]; see also id. at 10 ("[T]here is something approach-
ing unanimity on the proposition that the prevailing discourse of religious free-
dom-or the official framework and language within which issues of religious
freedom are argued about and judicially resolved-is deeply incoherent.").
177. See id.
178. Throughout his discussion of the mediating functions of associations,
Robert Vischer describes various examples of such degradation. See Vischer, As-
sociations, supra note 46, at 965 (stating that if state intervention prevents associa-
tion from pursuing "ventures found meaningful by members, the functions of
expression, identity, and purpose would be eviscerated; the association would
cease playing a mediating role, and would simply be an arm of the state"); id. at
990 (discussing "an association that unwittingly eviscerates its own mediating func-
tion by becoming reliant on governmental largesse"); id. at 1000 ("[If a religious
association] forego[es] its core mission or water[s] down its identity, . . . [this
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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association has been compromised because it has lost religious authority
to the state-as when, for instance, the government dictates a form of wor-
ship or meddles in a church doctrinal dispute. Perhaps the association
has been compromised in the opposite direction by absorbing coercive
authority from the state-as when, for instance, the government hands
over licensing authority to a religious group. This approach is structural
and functional, and it consequently suggests a baseline for thinking about
problematic church-state relationships; as to any discrete function, state
authority and a religious association should never coalesce into an identi-
cal, entirely overlapping entity. In the vocabulary of subsidiarity, the state
would have completely absorbed the function of a religious association,
and henceforth those functions of governing authority and religious asso-
ciation would be indistinguishable.
One might reasonably claim, however, that the object of the analysis is
outdated. After all, such overlapping church-state relationships have not
existed in the United States since 1833, when Massachusetts jettisoned the
last trappings of its congregationalist establishment.1 79 True enough, but
one should note why subsidiarity wants to avoid the paradigm example of
a religious establishment in which church and state authority coalesce.
Subsidiarity condemns the arrangement, but not because, as we are used
to saying, it "advances religion" or is "non-neutral with regard to relig-
ion"-these formulations both prove too much and nothing at all about
the undesirability of certain church-state arrangements. Subsidiarity, by
contrast, operates on a more concrete plane. It condemns the paradigm
religious establishment because the state has inappropriately involved it-
self in the functions and competences of a religious association. That sort
of involvement is undesirable precisely because of its impact on the medi-
ating function of the religious group and its members, and also because of
the accompanying impact on the mediating function of other social
groups and on the ability of the state to manage the common good.
Through the lens of subsidiarity, an "establishment" describes a situation
in which the mediating function of a religious association has been com-
promised. Its absorption into the state means either that it can no longer
would] .. .necessarily preclude any mediating function-i.e., as allegiance to the
government as a funding source increases, the association's ability to serve as a
mediating force between individuals and the government necessarily declines.").
Vischer's analysis shows how a focus on mediating structures helps flesh out why a
religious establishment is undesirable. I am not proposing the analysis, as he
seems to, as a means of interpreting the Establishment Clause itself. See, e.g., id. at
984-85 (discussing application of Establishment Clause in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)); id. at 996-1000 (discussing Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) and school vouchers). For a further discus-
sion of these analyses, see infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 141, at 93-94 (discussing disestablishment as-
pects of amendment of Massachusetts Constitution in 1833); see also GERARD V.
BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 23-24 (1987) [hereinafter
BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA] (describing that in 1833, Massachusetts be-
came last state to abandon "public prop" of tax-supported congregations).
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contribute to the greater human flourishing of its own members (because
it is no longer an autonomous organization), or that it can no longer con-
tribute to, and indeed would impede, society's realization of the common
good (because it has monopolized one or more important aspects of that
common good). Directing the inquiry in this way is appropriate not only
analytically but historically, because it focuses on the central rationale for
founding-era establishments.18 0 As Michael McConnell explains, the
"dominant purpose of the establishment" in both England and the colo-
nies "was not to advance religious truth, but to control and harness relig-
ion in service of the state." 18 1
Of course, modern establishment problems rarely present the com-
plete absorption of a religious association's functions by the state. In few
cases does a government entity either itself control, or delegate its own
functions to, a religious group.'8 2 Instead the problem typically lies some-
where on a spectrum short of complete absorption. For instance, school
voucher controversies present a struggle between state and religious edu-
cation that falls somewhere in this intermediate realm. 183 The problem
arises because the state attempts, through a voucher program, to create
more educational flexibility for schoolchildren. 184 One side of the dis-
pute fears that the state is surrendering its public educational function to
religious groups, or conversely, that religious associations will find their
own autonomy co-opted by participation in the voucher program. The
other side wants to equip parents with broader educational choices and to
share the fruits of private schools, whether religious or non-religious, with
the less wealthy. This side also wants to create healthy competition for
public schools and thereby improve overall educational quality. The
voucher problem, in short, is not the simple case of the state bluntly co-
opting religious organizations, but instead presents a web of competing
and partially overlapping interests and functions-public vs. private, relig-
ious vs. non-religious, less wealthy vs. affluent. 185
180. See McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra note 173, at 2208.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (striking
down Massachusetts law granting churches discretion to veto liquor licenses within
500 feet of their premises); see also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., & EDWARD McGLYNN
GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: HISTORY, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE
INTERACTION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT 881-82 (2001) (discussing cases on ex-
ercise of governmental authority by churches).
183. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers,
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 917 (2003) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman's Future].
184. See id.
185. See Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as Subversion: Local Power, Legal Norms,
and the Liberal State, 2 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 277, 282-84 (2005) [hereinafter
Vischer, Subversion] (discussing school choice movement in terms of subsidiary).
On the clash of interests and the constitutional issues involved in voucher debates,
see generally Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions about School Choice: Education,
Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CAROozo L. REv. 1281, 1313 (2002)
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Thinking through this problem in terms of subsidiarity would begin
with refusing to dilute its complexity. The problem does not map onto
formulae like "neutrality" or "choice," not least because the contours of
those formulae are themselves debatable (as is the prior question of
whether the Establishment Clause proposes them as norms). 186 Sub-
sidiarity takes a different route. Subsidiarity seeks to establish a construc-
tive equilibrium among an array of actors and their social functions: state
authority, public schools, religious schools and their connected associa-
tions, non-religious private schools, religious and non-religious associa-
tions without connected schools, students eligible for vouchers and their
parents and so on. Rejecting on principle that there is a neat solution, a
subsidiarity analysis would investigate the unique circumstances of a partic-
ular voucher problem (considering, for instance, the variety and types of
religious and non-religious groups in the area, its educational resources,
its history of religious conflict, its socio-economic and religious makeup,
etc.) and assess the relative competences of the various associations in-
volved. It would seek to locate decision-making authority as locally as pos-
sible (individual schools or school districts), while recognizing that higher
authorities (school boards or state educational boards) would need to dis-
cern what kinds of interventions would be necessary to remedy problems
as they arise. The overarching concern would be to preserve the maxi-
mum amount of autonomy for all private associations involved, consistent
with the freedom of the children and parents participating in the pro-
gram. In superintending this complex minuet, state authorities would be
acting to maximize the educational health of the entire society, while rec-
ognizing at the same time that they are doing so not through a monopoly,
but through cooperation with private associations who are capable of pur-
suing the common good themselves. 1
87
Needless to say, this sketch barely scratches the surface and an ex-
haustive, subsidiarity-based analysis of any particular situation is beyond
the scope of this Article. Generally speaking, however, working through
the analysis might result in an array of differently-configured school
voucher programs. Or it might result in none at all. A particular state
authority might reasonably decide that, in the interest of the educational
common good, voucher programs should be rejected precisely because of
their potential for creating religious conflict or because of their risk of
diluting religious associations' educational missions. By the same token,
local authorities might decide to experiment with vouchers on a limited
(stating that Ohio's voucher program is consistent with Establishment Clause);
Lupu & Tuttle, Zelman's Future, supra note 183 (discussing Supreme Court's effect
on relationships between government and religious institutions).
186. See, e.g., SMITH, EQUALITY, supra note 176, at 13-17 (discussing difficulty of
applying concept of "equality" to substantive questions of religious freedom).
187. Cf generally Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 995-1000 (analyzing
school voucher issue in Zelman from viewpoint of religious associations' mediating
role). For a discussion of Zelman, see infra note 248.
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basis, or to forego experimentation. Individual religious schools might de-
cide to participate in a voucher program, or instead might decide the risks
are too great.18 8 But whatever resolution is reached will not depend on a
pre-programmed rule about the right relationship between religion and
government. From the point of view of subsidiarity, general rules of the
genre-"separation of church and state" or "neutral between religion and
non-religion"-simply fail to do justice to the concrete paradoxes and
complexities that inevitably present themselves in a religiously pluralistic
society.' 89
The above sketch shows that, unlike current analyses of religious es-
tablishments, subsidiarity does not propose any a priori substantive view
about the "correct" relationship between church and state. Such a sub-
stantive view-e.g., that the state should be formally or effectively neutral
between religion and non-religion-would be foreign to subsidiarity be-
cause it would introduce a substantive bias into what is essentially a proce-
dural inquiry. It would create rigid divisions where subsidiarity seeks
flexibility and adaptability. That is, subsidiarity is interested in facilitating
the creation of a constructive equilibrium in which religious associations,
and the people in them, are as free as possible to pursue their goals, con-
sistent with the overall common good. It is inconsistent with that goal,
however, to say that the common good already includes some substantive
view of the relationship between government and religion. 190
To be sure, we might say that subsidiarity has a built-in procedural view
of church-state relationships. As already explained, it holds that govern-
ment should not absorb the functions of religious associations and vice
versa. But this procedural "separation of church and state" is far more
modest than the well-known varieties of substantive "separation"-again,
such as theories of neutrality or non-endorsement. Consequently, the sep-
aration latent in subsidiarity would leave a broader space within civil soci-
188. See, e.g., STABILE, supra note 93, at 355-63 (discussing potential threats to
religious associations' identities from acting as mediating institutions for social ser-
vices); Vischer, Associations, supra note 46, at 999 (suggesting that particular relig-
ious associations might decline to pursue state funding because "the outside
influence that accompanies the funding-whether through government regula-
tion, public pressure or otherwise-may actually hinder the groups' pursuit of
their original purposes, alienating core constituencies in the process").
189. The kind of analysis subsidiarity suggests for these problems can be de-
scribed as "prudential." For an excellent discussion of prudential decision-making
in the context of religious freedom, see SMITH, EQuALITy, supra note 176, at 62-82.
190. Patrick Brown writes that since "subsidiarity should be viewed as an open
and heuristic notion," then "[u]ltimately there is no rule, formula, or concept that
can tell us precisely how power should be delegated or tasks should be distributed
between any particular hierarchy of communities or organizations or within com-
munities or organizations. Everything depends on concrete insights appropriate
to particular and often changing situations." Patrick Brown, Overcoming "Inhu-
manly Inept" Structures: Catholic Social Thought on "Subsidiarity" and the Critique of Bu-
reaucracy, Law, and Culture, 2J. CATH. Soc. THouGHT 413, 428 (2005) (describing
functional subsidiarity and its contribution to common good).
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ety for the interaction of religious associations and government.' 9 ' Thus,
by comparison to traditional establishment analysis, subsidiarity is more
attuned to the distinct interactions between government and religious as-
sociations. It is not, however, concerned with background substantive the-
ories that prophylactically limit the permissible interactions between
religious associations and government. Nor, by the same token, is it inter-
ested in predicting, as current establishment analysis does, whether those
interactions will have the "effect" of "advancing religion" or creating "divi-
siveness." One might say, in sum, that the key difference between a sub-
sidiarity-driven analysis of establishments and a traditional analysis is that
subsidiarity is far more substantively modest.
It must be emphasized, however, what a subsidiarity analysis of relig-
ious establishments does not say. It does not suggest that subsidiarity pro-
vides a new and more powerful tool for courts to analyze church-state
problems. Indeed, the very difficulty and contingency of the subsidiarity
analysis confirm in practice what theory suggests: i.e., that subsidiarity does
not function comfortably as a source of a priorijudicial standards. Instead,
it is a general conditioning principle for attributing relative competences
among associations, which can aid decision-makers in chiseling out solu-
tions to multifaceted problems. The decision-maker, however, is not nec-
essarily, or even preferably, a court applying a constitutional or statutory
principle that purports to concretize, in advance, the requirements of sub-
sidiarityi 9 2 On the positive side, the analysis suggested by subsidiarity
functions without the baggage of slogans such as "separation of church
and state" or "maximum religious liberty." Whether or not those phrases
have any determinate practical content is debatable. Taken on their own
terms as sources of legal rules, however, they rarely provide enough gui-
dance to resolve the difficult problems that the church-state area seems
determined to present.
These conclusions present a problem, however. In light of them, one
is tempted to conclude further that subsidiarity is useless for interpreting
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. After all, for the last sixty
years, that Clause has been applied to church-state disputes through the
matrix ofjudicially-created legal rules. This part of the Article has thus far
191. In a recent essay, Michael Novak articulates a similar understanding of a
more modest "separation of church and state." He writes that:
[Separation] does point to an important difference of function and pub-
lic role. But that "separation" is not the same thing as demanding an end
to the interpenetration of religion and society. Church and state do not
cover the same territory as religion and society. Church and state are nar-
rower, institutional concepts. Citizens have a right to the free exercise of
their religion in private and in the full range of the public activities of
civil society.
Michael Novak, The Truth About Religious Freedom, FiRsT THINGS 19 (Mar. 2006).
192. For a discussion of the problems this conclusion presents in terms of
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 193-97 and accompa-
nying text.
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suggested: (1) that subsidiarity itself does not function comfortably as a
source for fixed judicial rules; and (2) that the "establishment problem"
viewed through the lens of subsidiarity is therefore not amenable to rule-
based determination. The natural conclusion would seem to be that,
whatever policy aid subsidiarity might furnish at the intersection of relig-
ion and government, it can offer no help in interpreting the Establish-
ment Clause. The next section grapples with this forceful objection.
B. Subsidiarity and the Establishment Clause
We can now attempt to understand the Establishment Clause itself as
an expression of subsidiarity. This will involve three steps, two of which
have already been discussed. First, in one aspect, subsidiarity describes a
structural strategy for allocating government powers, best seen in a feder-
alist structure. Second, the federalist structure of the U.S. Constitution
evokes that aspect of subsidiarity. The third step-one that will be ex-
plored for the remainder of this Article-is to suggest that the Establish-
ment Clause can be understood as part of the subsidiary strategy of the
Constitution. Applied in this way, subsidiarity helps explain a great deal
about the content and function of the Clause, about its history and appli-
cation and about its place within the overall constitutional structure.
Recall the two related but distinct aspects in which subsidiarity ap-
pears: (1) as a normative ordering principle guiding a decision-maker in
hammering out an equilibrium between competing social groups and the
state; and (2) as a description of the strategic allocation of governmental
powers in a federalist structure. 1 3 In its first aspect, subsidiarity appears
ill-fitted as a source for judicially-enforceable rules delimiting state author-
ity in advance because subsidiarity is by definition a conditioning influ-
ence on state intervention that demands flexibility. Limiting intervention
ahead of time to rigid categories or contingencies would sap the principle
of its power or change it into a toothless hortatory provision. Such is not
the case, however, when subsidiarity is expressed in a federalist system.
There the pre-existence of the constituent states allows subsidiarity to be
expressed through a governmental structure. Already possessing the com-
petences of self-government, the pre-existing states assign to the new cen-
tral government certain spheres of competence that they judge better
located there. Here subsidiarity does not function as a normative rule for
evaluating the exercise of governmental powers but is rather the theoreti-
cal blueprint for a tangible structure. 194
As a simple illustration will show, the U.S. Constitution has obvious
affinities with such a structure.195 About a decade after the American col-
193. For a discussion of subsidiarity's application to allocation of governmen-
tal powers, see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of subsidiarity's use as a blueprint for a governmental
power structure, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
195. For a discussion of the relationship between the American governmental
structure and the concept of subsidiarity, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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onies broke free from England, a group of states decided to reconfigure
their relationship from a loose confederation into a more tightly bound
and complexly imagined federal republic. The "people" of the constitu-
ent states were envisioned as reclaiming sovereignty and redistributing
portions of it to a new central government, "in order to form a more per-
fect Union." 19 6 The new government of the "United States" possessed
powers divided among branches and delimited to spheres of sovereignty
with respect to the states. For instance, the national legislature's powers
were enumerated in terms of areas of competence, such as to "declare
War," to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization" and to "regulate
Commerce with foreign nations."197 Other provisions calibrated areas of
competence between the states and the national government-e.g., with
regard to militias or the election of federal representatives. 198 The essen-
tially limited nature of the grant of powers is explicitly recognized by the
Tenth Amendment, which provides that "It]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 199 This strategy
of formation articulates concretely what subsidiarity prescribes in theory.
A glance at the ratification debates (well reflected in the Federalist
Papers and the writings of their anti-federalist opponents) shows that the
overriding concern of the framing generation was to confine the new fed-
eral government's powers and to reserve to the states sufficient autonomy
to preserve a healthy measure of autonomy and a fortiori their very exis-
tence.2"' Recurring throughout anti-federalist authors, for instance, is a
fear, often cast in the idiom of subsidiarity, that the powerful central gov-
ernment will "absorb" or "annihilate" the states. 20 1 In response, various
196. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
197. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3-4, 11 (listing Congress's powers).
198. See id. cl. 16 (empowering Congress to "provide for organizing, arming,
and disciplining, the Militia" while "reserving to the States respectively, the Ap-
pointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to
the discipline prescribed by Congress"); id. § 4, cl. I (declaring that state legisla-
tures shall prescribe "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives," but Congress may "at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators").
199. Id. amend. X.
200. On the contours of this debate, see generally FORREST McDONALD,
Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 185-293
(1985); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1776-1787)
469-562 (2d. ed. 1998). On the debate's relationship to the Bill of Rights, see
generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
3-19 (1998).
201. For instance, in the sixth of his essays against ratification, "Brutus" sum-
marizes his concerns as:
[W]hether the general government of the United States should be so
framed, as to absorb and swallow up the state governments? or whether,
on the contrary, the former ought not to be confined to certain defined
national objects, while the latter should retain all the powers which con-
cern the internal police of the state[s]?
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numbers of The Federalist take pains to reassure states that their own exis-
tences will survive, and indeed flourish, under the aegis of the newly cre-
ated central government, and also that its powers have been carefully
limited to those necessary to promote the common welfare of the
whole. 20 2
But our initial question remains: Assuming that subsidiarity accurately
describes the structural allocation of competences in the American federal
system, how does that help us understand the Establishment Clause as a
component of that system? For applying subsidiarity to the Clause imme-
diately creates a paradox. Subsidiarity would view the Clause as a decision
by the constituent states not to vest the new central government with com-
petence over a field the Clause describes as laws "respecting an establish-
ment of religion," and a concomitant decision to retain power over that
field at the state level. It follows that the Clause would not posit any com-
prehensive substantive theory of church-state relationships at the federal
Brutus No. 6 (Dec. 27, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENION DEBATES 280 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). In his second
letter, the "Federal Farmer" warns that the imbalance between federal and state
power would inevitably mean that "the state governments must be annihilated, or
continue to exist for no purpose." Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, No.
2 (Oct. 9, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION DEBATES, supra, at 268. As Gordon Wood explains, the anti-federalists
"had no doubt that it was precisely an absorption of all the states under one uni-
fied government that the Constitution intended, and they therefore offered this
prospect of an inevitable consolidation as the strongest and most scientifically
based objection to the new system that they could muster." WOOD, supra note 200,
at 526.
202. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 237, 241 (James Madison) (address-
ing "whether the whole mass of [federal powers] will be dangerous to the portion
of authority left in the several states," and reasoning that "[tihe powers delegated
by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined,"
whereas "[t] hose which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and
indefinite"); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 37-41 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 46,
at 242-48 (James Madison). See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 41-44, at 207-37
(James Madison). My claim is not that subsidiarity, as a political theory, is embed-
ded in the U.S. Constitution. Rather, my point is simply that the federal structure
erected by the Constitution evidences in concrete practice the theoretical linea-
ments of subsidiarity. Furthermore, this claim concerns the structure of the U.S.
Constitution, and not necessarily the operations of the national government's pow-
ers. To make the latter claim would re-introduce all the problems inherent in
using subsidiarity as a source of normative constitutional rules. While subsidiarity
gives an account of why the federal government was allocated certain areas of com-
petence, it may well not describe how the federal government actually exercises its
powers. For instance, the federal government might well exercise its powers to
regulate interstate commerce in a way that disregards the competing competences
of state governments, or it may act in a more restrained manner. Regardless, the
claim is not that subsidiarity is an a priori constitutional limit on the exercise of
federal power (although it may function as a prudential limitation on federal rep-
resentatives), nor is the claim that federal courts are somehow "enforcing" sub-
sidiarity when they police the boundaries of the commerce power. One would do
better to speak of a court enforcing subsidiarity indirectly when it enforces the con-
stitutional limits on federal power.
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level. The Clause would also appear to be an unlikely source forjudicially
enforceable rules about most church-state issues. The paradox presented,
of course, is that this subsidiary view of the Establishment Clause bears
little resemblance to the Clause the Supreme Court has been struggling to
interpret for the past two generations.2 0 3 That Clause is supposed to con-
tain, albeit in a maddeningly obscure fashion, answers to questions such
as: "Does a large menorah next to a Christmas tree outside city hall consti-
tute a forbidden establishment of religion?" 20 4 The subsidiary Clause, by
greatest contrast, would offer as its only response to such a question: "We
have thought it best to leave such questions to the states."
20 5
So we are thrown back again, and now even more pointedly, on the
original dilemma: What good is subsidiarity to understanding the Estab-
lishment Clause? But again, simply refining the question suggests some
answers. The counter-intuitive picture of the subsidiary Establishment
Clause actually illuminates a basic difficulty courts and commentators have
encountered in interpreting and applying the Clause. Specifically, sub-
sidiarity shows why it is difficult to reconcile modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, which treats the Clause as a source of rules for resolving
specific church-state issues, with the history of the Clause, which suggests
that the Clause was neither proposed as a normative source for resolving
most church-state disputes, nor intended to embody any overarching the-
ory of church-state relationships.
The genesis of the Constitution and the First Amendment bedevils
our modern search for "constitutional" church-state principles. The fram-
ing, text and ratification of the First Amendment do not reveal what sub-
stantive church-state theory, if any, was being promoted by the religion
203. In another sense, however, subsidiarity simply underscores and provides
a fuller theoretical account for something that religion clause scholars have long
observed, so much so that Steven Smith describes it as a "commonplace": i.e., that
"[t] he religion clauses, as understood by those who drafted, proposed, and ratified
them, were an exercise in federalism." STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE:
THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18 (1995)
[hereinafter SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE] (listing sources collected in Note, Re-
thinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1700, 1703
n.25 (1992)).
204. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600-01 (1989) (not-
ing Establishment Clause "limits religious content of the government's own com-
munications" as well as "[prohibits] government support and promotion of
religious communications by religious organizations .... By prohibiting govern-
ment endorsement of religion, the Establishment Clause prohibits precisely... the
government's lending its support to the communication of a religious organiza-
tion's religious message").
205. That is not to say, it bears noting, that the menorah-and-Christmas-tree
situation even implicates the basic idea of a religious establishment, nor that the
subsidiary Establishment Clause would bar the federal government from setting up
such a display. The example is meant to suggest only that the subsidiary Clause
would not have been formulated to answer substantive questions such as the one
the Court labored at so mightily in Allegheny County. For a discussion of Allegheny
County, see supra note 204.
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clauses. 2° 6 The Constitution those clauses amended contains only one
substantive rule about the place of religion in the federal government (Ar-
ticle VI's ban on federal, but not state, religious tests for office) and one
subtle accommodation of religious scruples (the "oath or affirmation" pro-
visions). 20 7 Debates over substantive church-state theories in framing and
ratifying the original Constitution 20 8 are sparse and inconclusive, 20 9 sup-
porting Gerard Bradley's common sense conclusion that "[t]he Philadel-
phia Framers were not concerned with religion, because they believed
theirs was a project unrelated to it." 2 10 A straightforward search for consti-
tutional church-state theories in the framing and ratification debates thus
seems to lead nowhere.
Subsidiarity reorients our search for Establishment Clause meaning to
the states' perspectives, focusing on their concerns about the powers of
the new central government and their own abilities to continue to govern
themselves. When we do that, the lack of substantive theorizing about
church-state relations becomes less surprising. It is widely understood that
the overriding concerns about the Constitution as a whole centered
around the nature and extent of the powers being confided to the new
central government, and the possible consequences of the exercise of
those powers on the states.2 11 Subsidiarity would see state concerns about
church-state matters as mirroring states' wider concerns about federal
206. See, e.g., BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA, supra note 179, at 112 ("Not
a single state recorded debates, and individual voting behavior was rarely memori-
alized."); WITrE, supra note 141, at 64 ("The record of the Congress's effort [to
draft the religion clauses] is considerably slimmer than is apt for such a momen-
tous act.").
207. U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3 ("[N] o religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); id. (binding
all federal and state officers "by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitu-
tion"); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (setting forth "Oath or Affirmation" of President as "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm)").
208. The one exception is the debate over the No Religious Test Clause in
Article VI. For a discussion of the Religious Test Clause, see supra note 205. For a
discussion of the debate, which centered on state concerns that the absence of any
federal religious test would open federal office to Catholics, Muslims, Jews and
other undesirables, see generally BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA, supra note
179, at 74-75; Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of
Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 674, 694-
711 (1987) [hereinafter Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause].
209. James Hitchcock has written that "[t]he great enigma of the Religion
Clauses of the Bill of Rights is the fact that they occasioned so little discussion
during their enactment." 2 HITCHCOCK, supra note 158, at 29 (2004). He notes
further that "there is little record of the way in which the Religion Clauses were
received in the states." Id.
210. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause, supra note 208, at 711.
211. See generally, e.g., McDONALD, supra note 200, at 186 (observing that "one
absolutely central issue-perhaps the absolutely central issue-before the [Phila-
delphia] convention was the role, if any, that the states would play in the reorga-
nized and strengthened common authority"); WOOD, supra note 200, at 519-32
(describing political debates surrounding extent and nature of federal powers
under new Constitution).
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power in general. The framers and ratifiers would thus have had no incli-
nation to debate what substantive theory of church-state relationships to
embed in the new Constitution (as opposed to debating, for instance, the
scheme of representation in Congress or the taxing power of the federal
government). This makes sense of John Witte's observation that "[i]t was
commonly assumed at the convention that questions of religion and of
religious liberty were for the states and the people to resolve, not the bud-
ding federal government." 2 12
The church-state issue that did occupy the states was not substantive,
but jurisdictional: Whether the new Constitution reliably limited federal
power over their own church-state arrangements. 21 3 Thus six states were
moved to condition ratification on the adoption of limitations on federal
power, variously phrased, over some aspect of religion or religious estab-
lishments. 21 4 These proposals and the formulations that then percolated
through the Congress, while motivated by substantive church-state theo-
ries, 2 1 5 were clearly not designed to create new federal powers modeled
on those theories. Instead they were meant to curtail federal power over a
sensitive area of state competence. Subsidiarity readily makes sense of
such proposals within the framework of building a federalist, and hence a
subsidiary, governmental structure. On the threshold of their bold new
experiment in a federal republic, the pre-existing constituent states
wanted to safeguard their own prerogatives in an area where the bitter
memories of an established national church were still fresh. The Estab-
lishment Clause was drafted to declare and underwrite that understand-
ing. As Carl Esbeck explains, the Clause was not only a vertical,
federalism-based restraint on federal power,
[i]t was also a public proclamation of sorts. The First Congress
was laying to rest latent but widespread fears about the new cen-
tral government by declaring the popular sentiment: although
212. WIrrE, supra note 141, at 61.
213. See 2 HITCHCOCK, supra note 158, at 29 & n.70 (listing authorities). Com-
menting on the "mysterious" silence of the Framers on the content of the Religion
Clauses "given the passionate debates engendered by those terms in later history,"
James Hitchcock writes that the "silence is comprehensible on the assumption that
the terms were largely devoid of positive content and were intended merely to
ensure that the federal government did not interfere with the religious arrange-
ments of the various states." Id. at 29
214. See WITTE, supra note 141, at 63-64.
215. See id. at 64 (citing several proposed amendments on religious liberty, in
particular stating that those from New Hampshire, Virginia, New York and North
Carolina were "critical"). For instance, Virginia's proposal claimed:
That religion, or the duty which we owe our creator, and the manner of
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by
force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and
unalienable right to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates
of conscience, and that no particular religious sect or society ought to be
favored or established by law in preference to others.
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there were state-by-state disagreements concerning official sup-
port for religion, the national government was one of limited del-
egated powers and hence had no say in the matter.
21 6
Subsidiarity thus supports the understanding that the framing and
ratification of the religion clauses, and the Establishment Clause in partic-
ular, were principally directed to preserving state power and confining
federal power over church-state arrangements. 2 17 Behind the amendment
proposals and the final Clause itself was the background goal of preventa-
tively limiting the exercise of some inchoate power of the new federal
2 18
government over a particular realm of state decision-making (a power
which, of course, federalist proponents of the new Constitution vehe-
mently denied). 21 9 When federalists denied that such amendments were
necessary, they did not emphasize positive federal guarantees in favor of
religious liberties. Instead they stressed the lack of enumerated federal
power to interfere in state religious arrangements and, famously in
Madison's Federalist 10 and 51, the checking function of a thriving multi-
plicity of religious sects. 220 In that vein, Gerard Bradley writes that the
216. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Govern-
mental Power, 84 IowA L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1998) [hereinafter Esbeck, Establishment
Clause] (citing THOMAS J. CURY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 193-94, 215-16 (1986)).
217. This understanding of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause
has occasioned a lively debate among scholars. See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY LJ. 19 (forthcoming 2006), available at
www.ssrn.com/abstract =900372 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006) (summarizing debate
over federalism aspects of Establishment Clause) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Feder-
alism and Faith]. The purpose of this article is not to take sides in the debate, but
to argue that subsidiarity supports the view that the primary goal of the Establish-
ment Clause was federalist-i.e., to keep the federal government out of state
church-state arrangements-and that the Clause affirmatively did not posit any in-
dependently substantive theory of church-state relationships at the federal level.
218. See Wrrw, supra note 141, at 48, 300 n.84. Underscoring this point,
Madison alone showed an interest in amending the Constitution to extend guaran-
tees and disabilities in the area of religion to the states, but his view was not widely
held and was not influential in the drafting debates. See id. at 48, 74-75.
219. See, e.g., id. at 61 (reporting Madison's comment to Virginia Ratifying
Convention that "[t]here is not a shadow of right in the general government to
intermeddle with religion. Its least interference with it, would be a most flagrant
usurpation" and James Iredell's remark to North Carolina Ratifying Convention
that federal government "certainly [has] no authority to interfere in the establish-
ment of any religion whatsoever, and I am astonished that any gentlemen should
conceive they have").
220. See id. at 79-80; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 42-48 (James Madison)
(discussing structural remedies against factionalism and including within causes of
faction "[a] zeal for different opinions concerning religion"); THE FEDERALIST NO.
51 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (claiming that "[i]n a free govern-
ment the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights ...
consist[ing] in the one case in the multiplicity of initerests, and in the other in the
multiplicity of sects"). In his remarks to the Virginia Ratifying Convention in June
1788, Madison remarked that "[h]appily for the states, they enjoy the utmost free-
dom of religion," which "arises from that multiplicity of sects, which pervades
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thrust of the proposed religion amendments "reveals that the religious lib-
erty endangered, and for which protection was sought, was that liberty the
people had long enjoyed, which was currently enshrined in all state consti-
tutions and accorded with contemporary popular views on the subject."2 21
Subsidiarity's focus on limiting federal power also clarifies the sparse
records of the framing of the religion clauses. 22 2 Instead of attempting to
wring theoretical substance from the subtle shifts in the clauses' phras-
ing,22 3 subsidiarity suggests concentrating on the framers' structural moti-
vations and how they afforded a surprising measure of consensus among
federalists and anti-federalists. As Gerard Bradley describes, these comple-
mentary motivations were "the federalist view that Congress had no enu-
merated authority over religion in the first place . .. [and] the basic
antifederalist endeavor to preserve existing state constitutional regimes
from intermeddling federal legislation." 22 4 Those twin goals around
which both sides could unite capture subsidiarity's project of allocating
distinct governmental competences during the formation of a federal
structure. The Establishment Clause thus becomes not a latent formula
for resolving church-state disputes, but a political compromise designed to
avoid making those disputes a convulsive national issue.
This approach also helps contextualize the reservations expressed
during debates over the phrasing of the religion clauses. It becomes clear
that these reservations were neither about the contours of federal power
recognized by the clauses nor about what church-state theory the clauses
were instantiating, but instead were anxieties about what possible misuse of
the provisions would mean for state religious arrangements. For instance,
during the House debate, Representative Peter Sylvester of New York wor-
ried that a misguided "construction" of the amendment "might be
thought to have a tendency to abolish religion altogether," while Roger
Sherman "thought the amendment [was] altogether unnecessary, inas-
much as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to them by the
constitution to make religious establishments," a position also suggested
America, and which is the best and only security for religious liberty in any soci-
ety." 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 88 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987).
221. BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA, supra note 179, at 78. Bradley con-
cludes that, in flat contradiction to the Everson Court's historical understanding of
the Establishment Clause as representing a revolution in church-state relation-
ships, "the ratifying process was deeply conservative in its celebration of the pre-
sent and immediate past and in its insistence that the prevailing regime need be
preserved inviolate." Id. at 80.
222. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 141, at 64-72 (discussing drafting of First
Amendment religion clauses).
223. See id. at 72 (noting that "[t]he final text [of the religion clauses] has no
plain meaning" and "[tuhe congressional record holds no Rosetta Stone for easy
interpretation").
224. BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA, supra note 179, at 92 (commenting
on Samuel Livermore's addition of "Congress" to clarify House version of amend-
ment, but stating that his comments apply equally to entire drafting process).
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more subtly by Madison in the debate. 225 Taking a different tack, Daniel
Carroll supported the amendment and suggested that "[h]e would not
contend with gentlemen about the phraseology," but only because "it
would tend more towards conciliating the minds of the people to the Gov-
ernment."226 Elbridge Gerry's reaction to the proposed insertion of "na-
tional" before "religion" shows that worries over federal power were
foremost in his mind. 227 Gerry objected to the change from "no religion
shall be established" to "no national religion shall be established," not be-
cause he wanted to clear the way for Congress to found a national religion,
but because the word "national" raised the specter of a consolidated gov-
ernment so repugnant to anti-federalists. 228 Finally, Benjamin Hunting-
ton's anxieties most dramatically illustrate solicitude for state religious
arrangements. Huntington feared that a broad interpretation of the
amendment would grant a federal court jurisdiction to interfere in New
England states' enforcement of compulsory support for ministers' salaries,
but Madison assured him it would not.229 As generations of religion
clause scholars can attest, the unhappy truth is that these minimalist de-
bates provide little help in defining an "establishment of religion." Sub-
sidiarity helps us see, however, that the debate was not even directed to the
question of resolving anything so momentous as "the church-state ques-
tion." Rather, the debates strongly suggest a shared anxiety about reserv-
ing state management over a sensitive area of social policy. 23 0 Although
225. WITTE, supra note 141, at 66. Madison followed Carroll's comments by
explaining his view that the provision meant "that Congress should not establish a
religion," enforce it by law, nor compel anyone to worship contrary to his con-
science. Id. But Madison immediately added that "[w]hether the words are neces-
sary or not, he did not mean to say, but they had been required by some of the
State Conventions, who seemed to entertain" fears about Congress' power under
the necessary and proper clause." Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 67.
228. Id. (explaining that "[i]t has been insisted upon by those who were
called antifederalists, that this form of Government consolidated the Union").
229. See id. at 66-67 (explaining views of Huntington and Madison); see also 5
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 220, at 92-94 (setting out House debates
on religion clauses). Gerard Bradley accurately parses the final exchange between
Huntington and Madison. Huntington, as Bradley explains, "was asking Madison
whether the New England system, much more coercive than even the general as-
sessment opposed by Madison in 1785, might be an establishment.. .. Madison
alleviated this fear, clearly indicating that there was no conflict." Id. Bradley adds
that, in Everson, Justice Rutledge's dissent got this exchange exactly backwards, un-
derstanding Madison to be saying that the compulsory clergy tax was in fact an
"establishment of religion." See BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMEMCA, supra note
179, at 91; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-23 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
230. See 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 220, at 90. In that vein
were the remarks of future Supreme CourtJustice James Iredell at the North Caro-
lina Ratifying Convention inJuly 1788, one year before the drafting of the religion
clauses. Iredell defended at length Article VI's prohibition on federal religious
tests as a prime instance of the proposed Constitution's solicitude for religious
liberty. The connection in Iredell's thinking between the discrete limitation over
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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the participants did not know the term, this was a debate over subsidiarity,
and not one over substantive church-state matters.
In addition to suggesting that the Establishment Clause was originally
concerned with protecting state competences over establishment policy,
subsidiarity also suggests it is anachronistic to read the Clause as offering a
comprehensive theory of church-state relationships for enshrinement at
the national level (or, for that matter, for incorporation against the
states).231 The absence of church-state theory in the Clause follows from
the withholding of federal competence over religious establishments.
Viewed through the lens of subsidiarity, if the Clause represents the elec-
tion not to nationalize church-state relationships, then the last thing we
should expect to find within the Clause is a substantive theoretical account
of those relationships. A "substantive theoretical account" simply refers to
what Steven Smith calls "first-order or substantive" questions about relig-
ion and the state, such as: "Should the state subsidize a religion? Should it
support all religions, or at least all Protestant religions, on equal terms?
Should religious heresy or blasphemy be punished?" 232 By contrast, "sec-
ond-order" questions concern "governmental organization, or the alloca-
tion of jurisdiction." 233 In Smith's terms, subsidiarity suggests that the
Establishment Clause is not concerned with first-order religion questions.
Instead, the subsidiary Clause underscores the answer already implicitly
given by the Constitution to the second-order question about jurisdiction
over state religious establishments.
Unlike most originalist examinations of the Clause, a subsidiarity
analysis of the Clause's theoretical content avoids the hopeless task of
parsing different formulations of the religion clauses and divining the in-
religion in Article VI and the generalized absence of federal power over state relig-
ious establishments is evident from the following remarks:
Upon the principles I have stated, I confess the restriction on the power
of Congress [in Article VI] ... has my hearty approbation. They certainly
have no authority to interfere in the establishment of any religion whatso-
ever; and I am astonished that any gentleman should conceive they have.
Is there any power given to Congress in matters of religion? Can they
pass a single act to impair our religious liberties? If they could, it would
be a just cause of alarm.
Id. Iredell reinforced this point by pointing to the Guarantee Clause of Article IV,
Section 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Repub-
lican form of government"), which implied some potential for federal interference
in state governments. By contrast, if the federal Congress had "undertaken to
guaranty religious freedom, or any particular species of it, they would then have
had a pretence to interfere in a subject they have nothing to do with." This was
not the case, and therefore, Iredell assured the Convention, "[e]ach state ... must
be left to the operation of its own principles." Id.
231. For a discussion of incorporation of the Establishment Clause, see infra
notes 246, 249 & 251 and accompanying text.
232. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 19.
233. Id.
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tentions of their authors or ratifiers. 234 If, as subsidiarity suggests, the
states' overriding concern centered on the exercise of federal power over
the subject matter of religious establishments, then the religion clause ar-
chitects likely would have avoided as impractical and unnecessary the task
of formulating some preferred theory of church-and-state and projecting
it into the Constitution. This view does not tempt us to search the entrails
of the various religion clause formulations for hidden theories, but instead
to take a wider view of the background against which those amendments
were made and debated. For subsidiarity, the key historical point is this:
Before and after the passage of the Constitution and its religion clauses,
the hard substantive work in the church-state area occurred not at the
national level but in the states, where it would continue for another cen-
tury-and-a-half. 23 5 As Carl Esbeck explains, the "disestablishment" of ex-
isting state establishments was neither a national watershed nor was it even
the work of the First Amendment. Instead, "disestablishment unfolded
more gradually, state by state, and somewhat differently in each state, de-
pending on the state's unique colonial background. '23 6 Given where the
work of disestablishment occurred, the state level was where church-state
theories were needed, and a subsidiary Establishment Clause would be
chiefly concerned to see that they were kept there.
As a subsidiary provision, the Clause is in fact the opposite of grand
theorizing. As already observed, theories of church-state relationships cer-
tainly lay behind founding-era debates about whether an Establishment
234. After a careful parsing of the various state proposals, the numerous
House and Senate formulations and the recorded debates, John Witte concludes
that "[t] he final text has no plain meaning .... [t] he congressional record holds
no Rosetta Stone for easy interpretation," and that, even given twenty separate
drafts of the clauses to sift, "[tihe congressional record holds no dispositive argu-
ment against any one of the nineteen interim drafts and few clear rules on why the
sixteen words that comprise the final text were chosen." WITE, supra note 141, at
72; see also SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 46-48 (discussing diffi-
culties of modern, originalist project of trying to reconstruct answers to first-order
religion questions from historical evidence).
235. Commenting on the surface secularity of the new Constitution, John
Witte elaborates precisely this point:
The seeming impiety of the work of the 1787 Constitutional Convention
must be understood in political context. It was commonly assumed at the
convention that questions of religion and of religious liberty were for the
states and the people to resolve, not the budding federal government. By
1784, eleven of the thirteen states had already crafted detailed constitu-
tional provisions on religious liberty.... The mandate of the 1787 con-
vention was to create a new national sovereign with enumerated powers
and delineated procedures. What was specifically not given to this new
federal sovereign was to be retained by the sovereign states and the sover-
eign people.
Federal power over religion was not considered part of this new constitu-
tional calculus.
Wirr, supra note 141, at 61.
236. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in
the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1385, 1393 (2004).
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Clause (and the Religious Test Clause) was desirable. The content of
those theories, however, differs from a subsequent decision to vest a
church-state theory in the federal constitutional milieu via the E. *ablish-
ment Clause. Separating these two distinct ideas is crucial to a subsidiary
view of the Clause. Subsidiarity as a structural principle is not concerned
with managing substantive legal theories or legal outcomes. In this area,
for example, it does not arbitrate between "benevolent neutrality" or
"strict neutrality." Nor does it propose to answer the problem of religious
symbolism in the public square. Instead, as it relates to federalism and the
Establishment Clause, subsidiarity concerns the assignment of compe-
tences among constituent governmental structures. Thus subsidiarity asks
whether the Clause integrates into a federal structure and, if so, whether it
adds or subtracts competences to or from the central government. As dis-
cussed above, subsidiarity supports a view of the Clause's historical context
which suggests that the Clause is a negative provision vis-A-vis the federal
government. But in any case, the answers to those questions are separate
from the question of whether the Clause enacts a theory of church-state
relationships. The latter is not a concern of subsidiarity when one views it
as a principle of structural allocation of competences.
Subsidiarity would thus read the historical context as contradicting
the idea that the "religion" clauses of the First Amendment are actually
concerned with the finer points of religious political theory. Their objec-
tive would have been emphatically to avoid adding a substantive layer of
church-state theory to the nascent federal government. This helps explain
why the framers and ratifiers were able to agree on the religion clauses in
the first place. An abiding mystery is how the founding generation-with
church-state views as divergent as Virginia voluntarists, Massachusetts tradi-
tionalists and Baptist dissenters-managed to agree with such apparent
ease on a national "religion" amendment. Subsidiarity supports the com-
monsense, but paradigm-shifting, answer of a theorist like Steven Smith,
who states that, in fact:
[T]hey did not agree; instead, they chose in effect to avoid an-
swering the first-order question [about religion and government]
by leaving it to the states. The religion clauses kept the national
government out of religion not because governmental support
for religion was generally regarded as improper-that was pre-
cisely the issue on which the traditional and voluntarist positions
divided-but rather because the religion question was within the
jurisdiction of the states.
If we ask, therefore, what principle or theory of religious liberty
the framers and ratifiers of the religion clauses adopted, the most
accurate answer is "None."2 37
237. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 21. But see Noah Feld-
man, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 346 (2002).
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On this account, theoretical accounts of church-and-state in the First
Amendment elude us because the framers and ratifiers of the First
Amendment could have never agreed which theory to include there.2 38
Subsidiarity thus underwrites Smith's elegant explanation that amending
the Constitution sought to keep the application and development of such
theories off of the national stage.
23 9
As subsidiarity elaborates, the dynamics of building a federalist struc-
ture are deeply incompatible with the idea that the Establishment Clause
added a new sphere of federal competence to the Constitution. The next
one-hundred-and-fifty years of American religious history silently but elo-
quently illustrate that same point: The Constitution and its religion clauses
played virtually no direct role in regulating church-state relationships. 2 40
As it had before, the delicate task of balancing the interactions of religious
groups, non-religious groups and government authority continued in myr-
iad state constitutional provisions, statutes and judicial decisions. 24 1 In
short, the states' broad police powers over church-state arrangements were
not touched by the First Amendment. As Forrest McDonald vividly ex-
plains, this meant "the states could still, in the interest of public morality,
establish the mode and manner of religious worship and instruction, and
they could levy taxes for the support of religion-as Connecticut and Mas-
sachusetts continued to do for many years." 242 At most, the religion
clauses could be said to have maintained the political and sociological con-
ditions under which various aspects of religious liberty could emerge
through experimentation and evolution. This has all the earmarks of a
subsidiary solution to a thorny problem-seeking equilibrium, as opposed
238. As Daniel Conkle observes, the various actors involved in framing and
ratification of the religion clauses
simply could not have agreed on a general principle governing the rela-
tionship of religion and government .... If the establishment clause had
embraced such a principle, it would not have been enacted. What united
the representatives of all the states, both in Congress and in the ratifying
legislatures, was a much more narrow purpose: to make it plain that Con-
gress was not to legislate on the subject of religion, thereby leaving the
matter of church-state relations to the individual states.
Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1113, 1133 (1988).
239. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 21 (arguing that "it
is futile to try to extrapolate or reconstruct a principle or theory of religious liberty
from the original meaning of the religion clauses," given that "[t]hose clauses
quite simply were not based on any such principle or theory").
240. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 141, at 87 (observing that "[f]or the first 150
years of the republic, principal responsibility for the American experiment in relig-
ious rights and liberties lay with the states"). Witte observes that the Free Exercise
Clause figured in slightly more than a dozen Supreme Court cases before 1940, but
that the Court never found a free exercise violation and "often employ[ed] rudi-
mentary analysis of the religion clauses." Id. at 101. The Establishment Clause
factored into even fewer cases, with the Court also finding no violations. See id. at
107-08.
241. See generally id. at 87-100.
242. McDONALD, supra note 200, at 288 (citations omitted).
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to definitive solutions by locating decision-making authority at the level
best adapted to managing the issue.
But this subsidiary view of the Establishment Clause's object and theo-
retical content confounds our modern expectations of the substantive
work the Clause is supposed to do. Dating from the 1940s, the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause project has trained us to expect courts to
massage a substantive theory of church-state relationships from the Clause
with a caravan of accompanying rules and tests. Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion of Ewing Township,243 the first modern disestablishment case, at-
tempted to do just that in one sweeping paragraph-a kind ofjudicial fiat
lux-whose contradictions are still contorting the Supreme Court's juris-
prudence. 244 But the prevalence that subsidiarity affords to the Clause's
function in the federalist structure unhappily opens a void where we seek
substance. While such analysis has impressive explanatory power, it leaves
one viewing the Establishment Clause as a constitutional appendix where
243. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
244. In Everson, the Court announced:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be pun-
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State."
Id. at 15-16. Everson's tendentious use of history to interpret the Establishment
Clause has been widely criticized. See, e.g., BRADLEY, RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA,
supra note 179, at 91-92 (stating thatJustice Rutledge "misfired, badly and momen-
tously"); SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 5 (mentioning Court's
"dismal historical performance in Everson"); Conkle, supra note 238, at 1130-35
(discussing "Everson-Rehnquist historical debate"); Esbeck, Establishment Clause,
supra note 216, at 25-26 (summarizing that "[i]gnoring federalism in the Clause
was an act of sheer judicial will [by the Supreme Court] which is still debated by
academicians today"); John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, in EssAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1957); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 311, 317-18 (1986) (commenting that
in Everson, Supreme Court "forced a square historical peg into a round doctrinal
hole by filing off a few of the more inconvenient sharp edges of history"). As
Michael McConnell writes, "[w]hen the Supreme Court began to decide cases in-
volving claims about an establishment of religion in the 1940s. . . . the Justices
made no serious attempt to canvass the legal history of establishment . . . or to
distinguish between the First Amendment and the various conflicts over establish-
ment at the state level." McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra note
173, at 2107.
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one was used to seeing it as a major organ. But the theory of subsidiarity
furnishes more than a negative account of the limits of the Establishment
Clause. At the same time, it provides an affirmative account of the role the
Establishment Clause has played in managing the problem of religious es-
tablishments in our complex, religiously pluralistic society.
As we have seen, subsidiarity is at bottom a conditioning principle for
attributing competences to the state and various social groups. In its mod-
ern form, subsidiarity can help construct a stable equilibrium in disputes
about the role of religious associations in a pluralistic society. While we
are accustomed to resolving such disputes through interpreting the Estab-
lishment Clause, the upshot of our discussion is that in the church-state
sphere, subsidiarity does not comfortably function as a source for a priori
rules for resolving those disputes. Thus subsidiarity, as said, is in tension
with the post-1940s development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
but it is able to provide what that jurisprudence has lacked from its begin-
ning: an intelligible account of the relationship between our constitu-
tional structure and the Establishment Clause itself. Simply put,
subsidiarity interprets the Clause as directing argumentation about
church-state issues and the concrete resolution of those issues out of the
federal sphere, where it virtually always existed before the 1940s. In that
way, the Establishment Clause interacts with subsidiarity just as federalism
interacts with the Clause. Just as federalism is the structural expression of
subsidiarity-in-action, so too is the Establishment Clause in the specific
realm of "law[s] respecting an establishment of religion."
Several consequences follow from this subsidiary view of the Clause.
First, the Clause becomes a direct assertion about the allocation of govern-
ment power and, at the same time, an indirect assertion about individual
and collective rights. While it evidences a decision not to nationalize
church-state relationships, subsidiarity also explains that this decision is
not merely a negative judgment about centralized authority, nor does it
simply ignore the question of individual rights and the common good. To
the contrary, the Clause stands as a prudential judgment about where the
common good regarding church-state matters was to be reliably pursued
and consequently, where individual and collective religious liberties were
to emerge most securely and concretely. Subsidiarity thus instructs us that
a limited Establishment Clause has nonetheless advanced a positive good
because it underwrites both federalism and religious pluralism as a way of
managing the problem of religious establishments. This supports Steven
Smith's argument that, in the two generations following the framing, a
combination of federalism and religious pluralism worked powerfully in
favor of religious liberties at the state level:
[I]t seems clear that this [religious] pluralism deserves most of
the credit for the elimination of religious establishments in this
country and for the spectacular growth of a diversity of religions
and faiths. For example, within a half-century after the adoption
[Vol. 52: p. 67
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of the Constitution, all states had eliminated their official relig-
ious establishments-wholly without prodding, we should note,
from the Supreme Court. During this same period a large num-
ber of religious movements and experiments sprang up through-
out the country.2 45
Second, while subsidiarity limits the theoretical content of the Estab-
lishment Clause, it does not empty the Clause of all judicially-enforceable
content. Importantly, however, it shifts our expectations about the kind of
content to be found in the Clause. If we understand the Clause as an
expression of structural subsidiarity (as opposed to subsidiarity as a sub-
stantive norm), then we should expect to find in the clause, for lack of
better terms, "boundary" rules as opposed to "substantive" rules. That is, if
the major thrust of the Clause is to cordon off an area of competence
from the central government and reserve it to the constituent states, then
one should be able to derive from the Clause fairly concrete rules for po-
licing those boundaries.2 46 Conversely, one should not expect to find
rules for resolving disputes that clearly lie across the boundary. Thus, one
would employ the Clause in accord with subsidiarity by saying that a fed-
eral law violates the Clause by trenching on state competence in managing
its own church-state relationships. But one would employ the Clause
against the grain by using it to say that a particular resolution of a church-
state problem is or is not appropriate in accord with some a priori rule
latent in the Clause.
This more limited scope for the Clause does not drain it of substance.
The boundary, after all, must be delineated. Consequently, a federal
court enforcing the Clause would need to discern the area of competence
withheld from the central government-according to the Clause, laws "re-
specting an establishment of religion." But this does not simply throw us
back on the perennial difficulty of defining that phrase. Viewing the
Clause as a subsidiary measure would have the additional benefit of limit-
ing and channeling the inquiry as to what constitutes a "law respecting an
establishment of religion." Because the Clause would now be viewed as a
concrete political compromise developed in a particular historical and le-
gal context, the questions a court would ask about the Clause's boundaries
would be accordingly limited. For example, one would be interested in
understanding as precisely as possible the legal contours of an "establish-
ment of religion" at the time of the framing and ratification of the Clause.
One would also inquire into the political and religious motivations behind
245. SMITH, EQUALITY, supra note 176, at 21. Smith goes on to note that al-
though this process was uneven and sometimes allowed persecution, "the ferment
that caused religious diversity to flourish-and that is largely responsible for the
condition of religious freedom we enjoy today-was a product of pluralism; it
owed little or nothing to judicial review, or to the legal elaboration and enforce-
ment of any constitutional 'principle of religious freedom."' Id.
246. Cf Esbeck, Establishment Clause, supra note 216, at 104-09 (exploring
question of "boundary keeping" posed by structural view of Establishment Clause).
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the collective decision not to vest the new federal government with control
over state religious establishments. Furthermore, one would need to iden-
tify the legal mechanisms that would have been used by states to "disestab-
lish" the existing establishments, which would be strongly indicative of the
legal means that were denied the federal government by the Clause. Of
course, we are not operating on a blank slate here, for there is a rich body
of historical and legal scholarship on these issues.2 4 7 It should be said,
however, that a subsidiary view of the Establishment Clause is not simply a
call for improved originalism. Subsidiarity focuses the legal-historical in-
quiry in such a way as to help fill out the substantive content of the Clause.
It also prevents legal history from being crudely co-opted as simply an-
other pillar of support for a particular theorist's preferred notion of
church-state relationships.
Moreover, viewing the Clause as a source for boundary rules does not
necessarily exclude some residual substantive content. Even positing that
the Clause was meant to assign governmental competences over church-
state matters, it is plausible that the Clause would also disable the federal
government from passing laws that produce secondary effects which would
trespass into state competences. For instance, if the federal government
established its own national religion, this would effectively interfere with
state decisions in the church-state area, while formally leaving those rela-
tionships untouched. Or the federal government might enact a nation-
wide voucher scheme that practically impedes state-crafted voucher
solutions, assuming that voucher schemes would fall within the "establish-
ment" competences of the states. Another upshot of this analysis is that
the Establishment Clause would not necessarily deprive the federal gov-
ernment of all power over the general subject matter of religion (so that it
might have the power to pass laws like the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 248 or Title VII's exemption for religious
employers249 ). The Clause would instead be understood as cordoning off
the federal government from an area of competence defined in terms of a
247. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
(2002); McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment, supra note 173, at 2131-81
(discussing legal components of establishments in colonies and early states). Mc-
Connell argues that the Supreme Court's historical understanding of what a relig-
ious establishment was, and how that should bear on interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, has been "truncated" and "careless." He contends that "[i] t
is difficult to know what the Framers of the First Amendment opposed if we do not
know what those who favored establishment supported." But "attempt[ing] to de-
scribe the actual laws and debates over establishment and disestablishment ... will
help foster a richer, and perhaps less brittle and bipolar, understanding of the
issues we face today." Id. at 2109-10.
248. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding section three of
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i (a) (1)-
(2)).
249. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding
exemption of religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition of employment
discrimination on basis of religion, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I).
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distinct set of legal conditions, conceived in light of the historical experi-
ence of establishments of religion. The Clause would speak only by infer-
ence to the exercise of other federal powers with regard to the broader
subject matter of religion.
The third consequence of a subsidiary view of the Clause, related to
the second, concerns the feasibility of deriving judicial norms from the
Clause. The view that a subsidiary Clause is a more likely source for
boundary rules than substantive rules helps explain core difficulties in the
Court's Establishment Clause cases. There is no need to rehearse the con-
volutions of that jurisprudence, 250 but subsidiarity suggests two general
explanations for the difficulties: (1) many church-state problems present
complex, intractable conflicts that are not amenable to rule-based judicial
resolution; and (2) judges and justices must develop and apply their own
theoretical premises to resolve church-state problems. Subsidiarity offers
no solutions to these dilemmas except to say that they were predictable.
If, as subsidiarity suggests, church-state problems often present irreducible
paradoxes that cannot be solved by a priori rules and can only be compro-
mised through political argument, then it is not surprising that judicial
attempts to solve them through rules would soon be mired in inconsis-
tency and unpredictability. If, as subsidiarity suggests, the Establishment
Clause is appropriately viewed as a structural attribution of governmental
competences rather than the incarnation of a particular church-state the-
ory, then it follows that judges attempting to employ the Clause as if it
contained such a theory would be constrained to import one.
These kinds of judicial rule-making dilemmas are not merely in-
stances of bad rules that fail to provide predictable answers. Rather, they
are situations where courts attempt to craft all-encompassing rules for
problems that seem inherently resistant to rule-based resolutions. Estab-
lishment case law bristles with examples. Arguably, the most tortured was
the Court's attempt to discern whether various forms of aid to religious
schools "advanced religion," resulting in a labyrinth of super-fine distinc-
tions.2 5I Another has been the Court's attempt to discern whether an "ac-
commodation" of religion appropriately lifts a burden on religious activity
or unfairly "fosters" it.252 Yet another quagmire has been the Court's in-
250. See, e.g., Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106-12 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (describingjurisprudential disarray at length and asserting that "in the 38
years since Everson our Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled
nor unified").
251. See id. at 110-11 (laying out contradictions of Court's no-aid jurispru-
dence). Among many possible examples, Justice Rehnquist observed that "a State
may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps of
the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in
geography class," and "[a] State may lend textbooks on American colonial history,
but it may not lend a film on George Washington, or a film projector to show it in
history class." Id. (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66 (1971); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)).
252. See, e.g., Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (describing Court's approach as
"recogniz[ing] that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate re-
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creasing use of an analysis which asks whether government use of religious
symbolism legitimately acknowledges the place of religion in society, or
instead wrongly endorses religion.25 3 Finally, some members of the Court
have begun to inquire whether a law has resulted, or will result, in an
unacceptable amount of "religious divisiveness." 254 Applying even sophis-
ticated rules to such situations has not led the Court consistently toward
non-subjective solutions, but rather has invited various justices simply to
reformulate church-state problems in the rule's terms. Conceivably, the
Court might announce blanket rules that would settle some of these ques-
tions-e.g., that the Establishment Clause forbade all government use of
religious imagery (including, presumably, the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the national motto, the national anthem and the names of various
cities like Corpus Christi, Texas), or that it forbade all government aid to
religion (including, presumably, all tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions and clergy, or perhaps the provision of fire and police services to
churches). But my point is that the Court has instead attempted to erect
complex rules that ostensibly balance the various competing interests and
policies in these conflicts, and this has resulted in spiraling confusion in its
ligious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause";
that "[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means
co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause"; that
"[t]here is ample room under the Establishment Clause for benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without inter-
ference"; but that "[a]t some point, accommodation may devolve into an unlawful
fostering of religion") (internal quotations omitted) (citing Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 14445 (1987); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 673, 669 (1970)).
253. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005) (stating
that Court's analysis, in part, involves asking whether "the government sends the
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members") (internal quotations omitted) (citing Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist.
V. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
254. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2857, 2871 (2005) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (upholding Ten Commandments display by relying in part on fact
that "[t]his display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations"
and "[t] hat experience helps us understand that as a practical matter of degree this
display is unlikely to prove divisive"); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I write separately... to emphasize the risk that
publicly financed vouchers programs pose in terms of religiously based social con-
flict."); id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated:
Admittedly, in reaching that conclusion I have been influenced by my
understanding of the impact of religious strife on the decisions of our
forbears to migrate to this continent, and on the decisions of neighbors
in the Balkans, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to mistrust one
another. Whenever we remove a brick from the wall that was designed to
separate religion and government, we increase the risk of religious strife
and weaken the foundation of our democracy.
Id. For an excellent discussion of, and demolition of, this divisiveness project, see
Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L. REv. 1667
(2006).
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jurisprudence. Viewing the Establishment Clause as a subsidiary provision
explains why: the Clause was not built for such uses.
It also explains why Establishment cases have featured dueling theo-
ries of church-and-state, most purporting to be derived from the historical
genesis of the Clause. At different times and in different cases, various
justices have attempted to solve disputes by reference to a smorgasbord of
church-state theories, classified under rubrics such as "separation of
church and state," "strict separation," "accommodation," "non-preferen-
tialism," "neutrality," "benevolent neutrality" and so on. 255 In the same
vein, justices have also taken differing views of the role history should play
in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, often using history to
underwrite a particular theory or outcome. 256 My modest point is that a
subsidiary view of the Clause explains why such promiscuous theorizing
would occur. Because the Clause itself contains no theory, justices would
therefore be constrained to import one if they want to use the Clause to
solve particular church-state disputes. 25 7 It is not hard to predict that this
will often result in a theoretical stalemate.
Finally, subsidiarity suggests a different approach to the difficult theo-
retical question of how the Clause can logically apply to the states. In a
sense, incorporation of the Clause is where the Supreme Court and relig-
ion clause commentators are not on speaking terms. The Court has ap-
plied the Clause against the states without ever considering the Clause's
255. See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 141, at 152-63 (classifying "unique, and often
sharply juxtaposed, approaches" Court has developed since 1947 for addressing
Establishment Clause problems).
256. For instance, compare the different conclusions reached by using history
to interpret the Establishment Clause in then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wal-
lace, Justice Black's majority opinion in Everson, Justice Rutledge's dissenting opin-
ion in Everson, Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman, and Justice
Scalia's dissenting opinion in McCreay. See McCreay, 125 S. Ct. at 2748-51 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (SouterJ., concurring);
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-104 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947) (majority opinion of Black, J.); id. at 32-43 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
257. Cf SMITH, FOREoRDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 63 (discussing possi-
bility of comprehensive constitutional theory of religious freedom). Steven Smith
goes further than simply asserting the theoretical emptiness of the religion clauses.
He argues that the attempt to formulate any comprehensive constitutional theory
of religious freedom-whose purpose is "to mediate among a variety of competing
religious and secular positions and interests, or to explain how government ought
to deal with these competing positions and interests"-will end up inevitably pre-
ferring one of those background "positions and interests" to others. Id. This is so,
explains Smith, because "any account of religious freedom will necessarily depend
on ... more basic background beliefs concerning matters of religion and theology,
the proper role of government, and 'human nature."' Id.; see also SMITH, EQUALITY,
supra note 176, at 45-61 (further elaborating why unified "theory" of religious lib-
erty is impossible). If Smith is correct about the impossibility of formulating a
theory of religious liberty that does not silently privilege some competing religious
or secular claim, this would exacerbate the problem of unmoored judicial theo-
rizing about the content of the Establishment Clause.
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federalism aspects, and has rebuffed any suggestion to reconsider the con-
tent of the incorporated Clause in light of its original function. 258 Com-
mentators, whether or not they want to reconsider the content of an
incorporated Clause, have often observed that application of the Clause to
the states presents a basic logical problem.25 9 Along these lines, one
might object that the entire analysis presented in this Article is practically
irrelevant: Whatever light subsidiarity sheds on the original place of the
Clause in the constitutional framework, the fact is that since 1947, the
Court has applied the Clause to the states via the Due Process Clause of
258. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48-51 (rejecting as against "elementary pro-
position of law" district court's "remarkable conclusion" that Establishment Clause
should be interpreted as not applying to states). But see Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709, 727-28 (Thomas, J., concurring) (asserting that "an important function
of the Clause was to make clear that Congress could not interfere with state estab-
lishments," and that Establishment Clause "is best understood as a federalism pro-
vision that protects state establishments from federal interference" (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 677-680 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring); Lee, 505 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
259. Steven Smith notes that "First Amendment scholars have often noted the
federalist element in the religion clauses, particularly in the establishment clause,
and have realized that this element poses difficulties, both historical and concep-
tual, for the theory that the establishment clause was 'incorporated' into the Four-
teenth Amendment and thereby extended to the states." SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE, supra note 203, at 18 (arguing that "the federalism of the First Amend-
ment may be even more important than its libertarianism") (citing, inter alia, MARK
DEWOLFE HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 29 (1965)); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1158-59 (1991) (stating that
conventional wisdom led to idea that "[i]f we assume that virtually all the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights, except the Tenth Amendment, were essentially designed
to protect individual rights, total incorporation of the first nine amendments
seems imminently sensible .... Unfortunately, that assumption is false"); Conkle,
supra note 238, at 1133; Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise,
90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1991) (asserting that "[a]s a matter of judicial crafts-
manship, it is striking in retrospect to observe how little intellectual curiosity the
members of the Court demonstrated in the challenge presented by the task of
adapting, for application to the states, language that had long [protected] the
states against the federal government"); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH U. L.Q. 371, 389 (declaring that "the First
Amendment built not one, but two walls of separation"); Note, Rethinking the Incor-
poration of the Establishment Clause, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1700, 1703 n.25 (1992) (com-
menting that there is "mounting evidence that a main purpose of the Clause was
,to protect state religious establishments from national displacement") (quoting
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-3, at 1161 (2d ed.
1988)). Akhil Amar captures the conundrum well:
[T]he nature of the states' establishment-clause right against federal dis-
establishment makes it quite awkward to mechanically 'incorporate' the
clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.... [T]o apply
the clause against a state government is precisely to eliminate its right to
choose whether to establish a religion-a right clearly confirmed by the
establishment clause itself.
AMAR, supra note 200, at 33-34. For a recent exploration of the federalism-incorpo-
ration debate among Establishment Clause scholars, see generally Lupu & Tuttle,
Federalism and Faith, supra note 217.
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the Fourteenth Amendment. That brute fact would seem to make the in-
sights of subsidiarity superfluous to modern application of the Clause.
But, as before, identifying seemingly intractable analytical difficulties often
reveals unexpected ways that subsidiarity can aid our understanding of the
Clause. In this case, subsidiarity provides both a critique of the Clause's
incorporation against the states, as well as a way of helpfully re-conceiving
it.
Incorporation of the Clause has actually been in the background of
this Article all along. Incorporation is, after all, the mechanism that ena-
bled the Court to apply the Clause to church-state problems in the states.
But the Court has never drawn a distinction between application of the
Clause against the federal government and against the states-it has pur-
ported to apply the Clause in the same way against both. Thus, a sub-
sidiarity-based criticism of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is, at the same time, a criticism of the way incorporation itself has been
carried out. It is not necessarily a criticism of the idea of incorporation of
the Clause itself.
But one could further object that a subsidiary view of the Clause by
definition forecloses its application against the states. If the Clause is pri-
marily a structural barrier against federal interference in state establish-
ment matters, then is it not true, as Steven Smith has argued, that
incorporating the Clause effectively repeals it? 2 60 Possibly, but that conclu-
sion has less to do with subsidiarity than with the content of the Four-
teenth Amendment. If, correctly understood, the Fourteenth
Amendment mechanically applies against the states all the substantive
guarantees formerly applicable only against the federal government, then
simple logic dictates that the Establishment Clause could not have been
incorporated-there would be no substance to incorporate. On that view,
attempting to apply the Clause to the states misses the fact that the pre-
incorporation Clause already addressed itself to both the federal and state
governments (unlike, for instance, the Fourth Amendment). 26 1 As sub-
sidiarity enters the analysis, however, its structural aspects suggest a helpful
way of looking at incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment. Fully
exploring this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but it can be ad-
dressed briefly.
Just as subsidiarity provides a vantage point for understanding federal-
ism, it can achieve the same result for incorporation. Incorporation, after
260. See SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 49-50.
261. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 200, at 34 (reasoning that, because "the origi-
nal establishment clause . . . is not antiestablishment but pro-states' rights
[and] ... is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus nonestablish-
ment and simply calls for the issue to be decided locally," then attempting to incor-
porate Clause is like attempting to incorporate Tenth Amendment); id. at 41
(noting that since "Congress had no more authority in the states to disestablish
than to establish .... [T]he establishment clause seems more difficult to incorpo-
rate against the states").
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all, involves a realignment of the federal structure, shifting certain areas of
competence from the states to the central government. The extent of that
realignment was the subject of intense and lengthy debate mainly focused
on the historical context and legal content of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. 262 A subsidiary analysis of the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause would attempt to situate its incorporation within the wider histori-
cal and legal context of Reconstruction.
When the Supreme Court decided to apply the Clause to the states, it
asked no questions about the feasibility of incorporation. It simply as-
sumed that the protections the Clause provided were in some sense funda-
mental, and proceeded to apply them with reference to what it now widely
recognized as shoddy historiography. 263 Subsidiarity, at the very least,
would provide an intelligible matrix for understanding incorporation of
the Clause.2 64 One would start by focusing on the historical context of
Reconstruction, looking for evidence that states wanted to transfer to the
central government certain responsibilities with regard to church-state
matters. Identifying specific church-state problems at issue would be cru-
cial because subsidiarity holds that the intervention of higher authority
should be limited by the contours of the particular incapacities that call
for intervention. This would involve intense historical work, but it is likely
that a great deal has already been done. Next, one would ask how the
Fourteenth Amendment can be understood as effecting a transfer of au-
thority to the nation over the subject matter of church-state relationships,
or over some subset of those relationships. This would also be a crucial
step in terms of subsidiarity, since the theory would require that such a
262. See generally AMAR, supra note 200, at 137-214; RAOUL BERGER, GOVERN-
MENT BYJUDICIARY 155-89 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing incorporation of Bill of Rights
in Fourteenth Amendment); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
263. For a discussion of historiography, see supra note 245.
264. Other scholars have suggested rethinking incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause by reference to the context of Reconstruction. See, e.g., AMAR, supra
note 200, at 246-57 (concluding after historical analysis that "we can now see how
the entire First Amendment was, in profound ways, reconstructed by the Four-
teenth"); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995) (stating that by Reconstruc-
tion, northern state courts had translated prohibition of original Establishment
Clause to be expression of fundamental religious liberty); Kurt T. Lash, The Second
Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994) (concluding that "[t]o those who would give
effect to the constitutional movements of the People since the Founding, the relig-
ion clauses must be read according to the intentions of those who fought a war
over slavery and amended their Constitution to incorporate the lessons of that
conflict"). Responding to Lash, Steven Smith states that Lash's arguments
underscore a crucial point: If a new originalism is to be based on a revi-
sionist account of the Fourteenth Amendment, the picture of govern-
ment's relation to religion that this new originalism produces will likely
look very different than anything that would have recommended itself
either to Thomas Jefferson or to the justices in Everson.
SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE, supra note 203, at 50-54.
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transfer of authority be effected by an intelligible political compromise,
hammered out in light of concrete circumstances. The entire inquiry
would be conducted against the background assumption that the original
Establishment Clause confided the calibration of the vast majority of
church-state matters to the states. That background, of course, is not only
a function of subsidiarity, but is an accurate description of American legal
history from 1776 until 1947.
Whatever such an inquiry may yield, it is unlikely that it would drain
the incorporated Establishment Clause of all substance. But it would
probably result in a far more modest Clause. Its primary benefit would be
to focus an inquiry concerning a major structural shift in federalism pre-
cisely on the dynamics of that shift. It would also remove the aura of unre-
ality surrounding incorporation of the Establishment Clause-namely,
that a constitutional provision that had never been used to police religion
in the federal government, and whose history suggested no theoretical
content beyond a structural limitation on federal power, could somehow
be brought to life after 150 years of dormancy and used to regulate the
myriad religious controversies of an increasingly pluralistic and religious
nation. As with the content of the Establishment Clause, subsidiarity does
not promise a solution to the incorporation problem. Instead, it proposes
an intelligible way of managing it within a concrete legal structure and
historical context, in a way that does not involve endless permutations of
church-state theory.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes subsidiarity as a way of understanding the kinds
of problems posed by the interaction of religious associations and govern-
ment. It suggests that such problems are better handled through political
management than rule-based judicial resolution. The Article also offers
subsidiarity as a way of situating the Establishment Clause within the feder-
alist structure of the U.S. Constitution. It proffers that the Clause is prop-
erly understood as a structural strategy for partitioning off the federal
government from a volatile area of social policy, one better left to individ-
ual states. Both conclusions are in real tension with our modern under-
standing of religious establishments and the Establishment Clause. But
this vexed area of jurisprudence and scholarship needs provocation to
shake off unhelpful theoretical baggage and to find promising ways
forward.
Subsidiarity suggests several paths. As to the modern problem of re-
ligious establishments as such, it proposes that it is far more complex and
multifaceted than the slogans of "separation of church and state" and
"neutrality" have led us to believe. Conversely, as to the Establishment
Clause, subsidiarity posits that the Clause is far more modest than two gen-
erations of Supreme Courtjurisprudence have led us to believe. A subsidi-
ary Establishment Clause is simply one integrated into the overall
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structure of the Constitution. From that point of view, the Clause appears
to address structure, function and jurisdiction more than it promotes
church-state theories or particular substantive outcomes. A subsidiary
Clause may not hold the answers to many of the problems we currently
associate with the Clause-for instance, the "correct" answers to religious
participation in voucher programs, or to the presence of religious symbol-
ism in government buildings-but it promises to be a Clause that courts
can use consistently and coherently.
This Article is only a sketch, albeit a lengthy one, of how subsidiarity
interacts with establishments and the Establishment Clause. By necessity,
it leaves many areas unexplored, such as how subsidiarity might actually
work in a variety of church-state problems, and also what a jurisprudence
of a subsidiary Establishment Clause might look like. One significant area
for further study is the question of rights. A structural Establishment
Clause, even one applied to the states through incorporation, might ap-
pear to slight the individual rights we have come to associate with the
Clause-such as the right against compelled tax support of religion or the
right not to be subjected to official religious ceremonies. The first half of
this Article is intended to lay a theoretical foundation for addressing that
problem by charting the connections between limited government, associ-
ational rights and human dignity. But much more could be said about
how that theoretical construct actually works in the context of religious
associations, the individuals within them and the individuals in the larger
society. As the theoretical sections indicate, subsidiarity would address this
problem by focusing on the dignity of the individual person who, precisely
because of his personhood, requires vibrant associations to be genuinely
free.
Exploration of those questions awaits further study, but a key insight
of subsidiarity, which this Article has attempted to explicate, is that before
we can understand how the Establishment Clause protects individual and
associational rights, we must first understand how the Clause interacts with
the federal structure of the Constitution as a whole. Incorporation of the
Establishment Clause has not liberated us from that difficult task. In fact,
the spectacle of the Supreme Court's establishment clause jurisprudence
should warn us that foundational questions about the meaning and func-
tion of the Clause are unavoidable. The fruit of ignoring them, as Everson
did two generations ago, seems to be congenital incoherence. Subsidiarity
provides key theoretical insights into the relationship between the Clause
and federalism, and thus contributes to an ongoing conversation about
the future role the Clause should play in resolving church-state disputes.
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